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INTRODUCTIOlf 
A survey ot works on the SepoJ Rebellion 
indicates that •� t writers are primaril7 concerne4 with 
the militaey aspects ot that nent an4 usuall.7 confine 
them.selves to that specific area. The ta writers who 
do 4well on the causes usuall.J restrict themsel"9'es to 
the cartridge incident and exclu4e any penetrating anal.1'• 
111 ot the protracted cause1 which Wel'e ot much greater 
s1gn1t1oance. The logieal but inaccurate dltduction to be 
11ade from such works is that the revolt ha4 its inception 
in the tew years immediately pric;>r to that event and that 
the cartridge 1ne14ent was the primaJ.'J cause. 
This paper 11 not concerned with the m111ta17 
aspects ot the rnolt. Rather it is the primary purpose 
ot this paper to show that the causes of the Sepoy 
Rebellion, most complex and intricately intertwined, Jn87 
be traced back to the inception or the English intluence 
in In4ia. Thia writer views the revolt as having 1 ts 
real causes 1n &ngl1sh social and economic retoJ'l'lls1 land 
policy, expansion, deterioration ot the native Sepoy armJ'J 
and cultural conflict. 1'h1s paper will examine these 
llanitol4 and protracted causes or the revolt and show 
that the famous cartridge incident was s1gn11'1cant onl.J' 
1n that it was the nece1sary spark that ignited the 
revolt. 
Furthermore this paper purports to show that 
these events, encompassing a oentury, provided a 10114 
base ot discontent that existed long betore the Sepoy 
Rebellion actual]¥ occurred. 
CHAPTER I 
EHGLISH EXPANSIOH IN INDIA 
An important cnuse of the Sepoy Rebellion was 
the incessant territorial acquisitions and consolidntion 
of English power in India which proceeded uninterrupted 
from 1757 to 1857. 
In the sixteenth century, Baber (1482-1530) 
1 
established a Moslem-Mogul Empire in India. successive 
rulers proved unusually capable ard the Moguls succeeded 
in vastly extending the boundaries of their empire, the 
success of which must be attributed to their unusually 
tolerant ard enlightened rule. These unique proponents 
of the Moslem faith respected the religious prejudices ot 
their subjects and established a government held in 
2 
singular respect by those in subjug tion. Conseqnently 
there arose a veneration for the emperor and the idea ot 
3 
imperial rule which manifested itself as late as 185?. 
1 G. D. Oswell, Sk_etche§ of R�lerf of I�dia 
(4 vols.; Oxfords Clarendon--·Press, 19�8) ol. I , P• 63. 
2G. B. Malleson, A�bar a,nd thQ Rise of tht 
�ughal Empire (Oxford• Clarendon Press, 190�), p. 200. 
3T. R. E. Holmes, A llistorx �f tbe Iglian 
Mutipy (London1 w. H. Allen & Co •• 18 8), P• 2. 
4 
The spectacular accomplishments of this centur1 ot 
Moslem-Mogul rule culminated in the latter half' of the 
seventeenth century during the reign of Aurangzib (1628· 
1707) whose rule ironically marked the height and decline 
of the Mogul Empire in India. Aurangzib' s Mohammedan 
fanaticism, religious bigotry, and careless disreg�rd 
of Hindu religious prejudice caused a gradual alienation 
>+ 
ot affection tor Mohammedan rule. The consequence of the 
disaffection was the ultimate precipitation of a re­
bellicn by the Rajpoots and Marathas which graduallf 
caused the empire to wane. Thus the difficult accomplish­
ments of a century of progress and just rule were 
decimated by the infamous Aurangzib, whose death found 
the empire in conplete decay ani the King of Delhi only 
the titular head ot a fictional empire.5 
Thus the opportunity for European political 
expansion in India, heretofore mostly economic in nature, 
was greatly enhanced by the rapid disintegration of the 
Mogul Empire and the ensuing chaos of the seventeenth 
century. The resulting political vacuum created a 
situation of unlimited opportunity, immediately seized 
upon by the various European colonial powers and culminat­
ing in a struggle for supremacy in India, a struggle in 
which the English were ultimately victorious. 
4 Edward Thornton, The History of the British 
Empire in India (London1 w. H. Allen & Co., 1858), P• i;. 
5st·,nley Lane-Poole
l 
A�ngzib and tjle �ecgy of' 
the Mughal Empirt (Oxfords C ara on Press, l')C8 , P• 206. 
The French governor or Pondicherry was the fir st 
to realize the implicntions ani potentialities of a 
situation characterized by mass disorder. Dupleix en­
visioned the idea of a vast French Empire in India and 
immediately seized on the opportunity afforded. 
The subtle designs and genius of Dupleix were 
confronted with one major obstacle - - na.�ely the 
English. Traditionally English and French settlements 
in India, by an urderstood mutual consent• pursued on 
enlightened policy of quarantining and isolating India 
from the wars of Europe. Thus the English and French 
settlements in India maintained peace among themselves 
while at the same moment these two arch-rivals might be 
engaged in a life-and-death struggle in Europe. 
The first confrontation anl clash of Anglo­
Freneh power in India occurrfl)(). as a consequeno e or the 
War of the Austrian succession (1740-48). This conflict, 
of European origin, soon spread to India where the French 
made initial gains by the conquest of the English settle­
ment of Madras. However, French assets in India were 
voided by English gains in North America and in 
particular the English conquest of Fort �uisburg on the 
St. Lawrence. In the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle these two 
strategic fortifications were exchanged an:l the itatus 
.aJlQ. restored in India. The consequences of the War o't 
Austrian succession were or utmost importance in India 
because the conflict terminated the Anglo-French pol1c7 
6 
' 
ot isolating Ind.ta trom Eurapean quanels. seooml.J' 
the conflict bred tempation on the part of both Englard 
and FrE\llce which guaranteed that ne1 ther could :reat in 
6 
peace until one was the paramount power in India. 
Duplei.J: now pursued an active and aggressive 
policy ot political intrigue designed to enhance the 
French position in India. The 11lag1native pclicy cf 
Duplei.J: manitested immediate results as the J'rench were 
able to install Chanda Sahib as puppet ruler ot Carnatic 
in 17lt9 and in 1750Mo.zaf.far Je.ng as ruler of the Del.than, 
in both cases by taking advantage of disputed succession. 
The cases of Carnatic and Dekhan were typical of the 
revolutions and counter-revolutiont plots, and counter. 
plots and dfnast1c intrigues that plasued India tor the 
nm several years as the English and French vied for 
position .7 
Victory tor the French in India depended. 
unconditionally on persistence 1n the policy ot DupleS.Z 
and unqualified support from a French government 
dedicated to bringing tl'.111 struggle to a victar1oua 
conelusicn. Neither ot these conditions tar victory woe 
pursued wt th vigor. France was e1 ther unwilling or un­
able to compete with William Pitt•s aggressive naval 
, 
0 
A.D.Innes, A Shor� Histoix Q.t twa Jgit11h IA 
In41A (Londons Methuen & co., 1902), P• 6�. 
7 lames Mill %be JU.•ton of Bt'iUsb IPQ� 
(10 vols.; London1 iiper, Stephenson & Spenee,1�58 ), 
Vol.III, P• 76. 
7 
pol1eJt and a turtha blow to F"runch ascen.ioncy in 
ln41a waa tb8 reIIO?al of Dupletx by the heneb. lut 
India � in 175\. TM h'encb poalt!on tn tats.a, 
nov J>"e1p1tat•l.J' h1n4eed, vas finall1 4ee1matff vttb 
the 1noepUon ot tbe snen Yeo.re• wo. 
V1etory tor the English in the Sff• Yeos• 
War VfrlS not v1tbout ttt !.}!'lee, fo, 4Ul"t.ng th• cO'Ql'ff 
ot that oont11et the E�ltlb tr.u:urrel ti. vntb ot an 
�uit element 1n Indian poUtloal atf'airt. 1'm 
Angto-r.rench ri'fal.Y ln southft'D. Inid.1a in the reua 
1.m.'.nediatel�' priOl" to ttw swan l@ars• war "*&.• not 41reet• 
e4 against e1f1 pat1tn1iar nat1w state. Th• English 
and French stmplf lent supvon to rival tect10ll  vt.ttdil 
a state vhce the legttima'• soit'de1gnty wu ln 41eput•• 
Batt• Polittcal taettons ,,,.•re u.Hd al pawns t.o tbt 
adVentage ot et.th• the Engltah ar Fftnob vltb tlMt 
'Pl"im&rY purpose be:lnc the eata•ltabment ot OOGD•l'Olal 
supro� am dominant p0Ut1oal t.ntlUl'lll\0'9 wttb V»• nat:1 .. 
stat.a. 
S1gn1t1aant1Y thts was not tht ca•• tn Deneal 
where the sV'Uggle naenit•etff eons1481'eb1e � u 
apropos to the sepor Rwolt beeauM �t the nature ot the 
eontUct and the Et\Cl'lsh t.aettc11. In 14mca1 tbl eoatltet 
vaa df.nc�l.7 bet�n the En1lt1b and the natl.ft •tat•• 
Prt.ct1cn soon aJ'(!!te beW.en the snaum aettlaent ., 
Calcutta and the Navab ot Benga11 Sm'e.3-"lld-dowlal'l. 
Unable to aoe!9o1"e the dU'f'erone" the 1'avab 4eet4*1 • 
8 
march on the English position at Calcutta, and on lune 
21, 175'6, the English surrendered after the treacherous 
betrayal of the incompetent Governor Drake who fled the 
scene on an English naval vessel. The garrison at Fort 
William was left to tb.e mercy ot the Nawab' s forces, the 
result being that 11+6 English prisoners were confined 1n 
the infamous Black Hole ot Calcutta tram which only 23 
8 survived. News of the disaster reached Madras in .A:u.gust 
and Clive was charged with an expedition to relie•e 
Calcutta and avenge the atrocit7 ot the Black Role. 
Clive•s forces retook Calcutta on January 2, 17'7, an4 
concluded an alliance of restitution am compensation with 
the Navab. 
Howner, friction soon arose anew between the 
'tYlo antagonists as a result or the outbreak ot the seven 
Yea.rs• war. Fort Willl8Jll had tall.en in.to disarray during 
the rule ot Governor Drake. He had totally neglected the 
defenses am f'orti.f'ica.tions of' the citadel apparent]J' under 
the illusion that the Anglo-Prench connict rag1Jl8 1n 
southern India would not engulf the English settlement 
at Fort Willia or the nearby French settlement at 
Chandernagar. The snen Years• War caused the Englith to 
desire the withdrawal ot reg:tments trom Fort William tor 
8 Freder ick E. Pierce and Samuel Thurber,J'r., 
(eds.), i:iaJaYJ.at's Easays °1t QJ,1!e eOO :F.la1t1nU. 
(New Yorks Holt & Co., 1911 , P• 39• 
9 
use 1n the Dekhan, but how to do this and still maintain 
the proper defense at Fort Willism against the untrust. 
worthy Nawab of Bengal was questionable. The only 
solution appeared to be the removal of the Nawab and his 
replacement by an English puppet, Mir Jatar, a minister 
in the Nawab's court. Clive now embarked upon a policy 
ot deception to achieve his pnrpose. He unhesitating]¥ 
applied the low standards or oriental rc>ther than 
occidental diplomacy freely using treachery, falsehood, 
deception, duplicity and political chice.nery to achieve 
the objective. 
The plot was executed at the famed Be.ttle ot 
Plassey on June 23, 1757, when Clive with a combined 
force o:t 900 English and 2 ,100 Sepoy soldiers det.1ated 
the Nawab's army ot 68,ooo men.9 English losses were few 
and the Nawab's army was completely routed and demoralized. 
On J'une 27th Mir .Te.far was enthroned as the English puppet 
10 
or Bengal. 
The final coup de .§_:l'_a_c� to French power in India 
was delivered in January or 1761, when the French citadel 
of Pondich.erry was overwhelr.ied. The Peace o! Paris ot 
1763 returned some of the French possessions in India but 
I 
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12 
provtded so many restrict-tons and limitations as to 
make these poss e s s ions valueless. 
Clive left India 1n F"'bruary of 1760, havinc 
gr0at1y enhanced the Bnglish position by adding 
considerable territory to the embryo English dominions, 
eli11inating the French and Dutch as rivals, and estub11sh• 
ing English supremacy in India. However, an indelible 
staJ.n. ·1'.ls eubedded on the record of Clive as a 
consequence of the Bengal affair and as a result 
sien!ficant animosity, hostility and ill-feeling arose 
between the English and natives. 
The conclusion of the SeTen Years• War was the 
inception ot English power in India tor it provided a 
solid foundation for fl.ll'ther influence nnd expansi<:>n. 
However, greater power del'!lands mor.e respons1bil1t,- and 
it was n�w incUJllbent upon tutu.re English rulers in India 
to detend the se possessions, the consequence of which was 
i'urther expansion. 
The tenure or Warren Hasting•s rule (1772-85) 
was genoral1y characterized by tranquillity and a policy 
of consolidation and conciliation. Expansion was complete• 
ly abhorred. Notwithstanding this basic philosophy, 
Hastings was enticed into an expedition tLat rewlted in 
ill-repute for the English in India. The Nawab ot Oudh, 
Shuja Daulah, desired thE'I t erritory ot Rohilkhan4 which 
lay on the Northwest Frontier of India. The Nawab used 
in addition to moral, economic, and political argument• a 
� pretem:lcd feur of a co:ribined i1ohilk.11o.nd--1·1aratha. 
Alliance '.Jhich ucu.ld .iangoi-ously threaten his pos1t1on.11 
Hastings, ·.:ho '\las obviously influenced by the fact that 
the safety or English Dengt".l was directly related to tha1: 
of Oudh, consented to tho r!a;1ab 's p:rasuasi ve argumon ts 
to garrison the Allahabad Jiatrict with English troops 
tor n sub3idy and provi�e English troop3 to �id in the 
conquest of Rohilkha..11d. Hast�.n; blundored by parW.tt1ng 
tho use of English troops and a.t tho sarae time neglecting 
to sec:Are the con::rol of the expadi tion u."lder a;.1 Er,lish 
COll1fl!a.ndor. This Engl1 sh oversight was b:t'ought into focua 
by the Na·,;a.ll's ruthless, supar1'1uous, violent, a11c1 
U.'1civiI:!.zod suppres"lion o-:f the Rohi.lkhand. Thus the 
English, who secnod to give support to the conquest, «ere 
much discred1tsd and their pos1t1�n �as £urthor ma.de 
distasteful by failure to provide rectitude tor the otfense. 
Signi.ficautly Hasting::: had c::i.rriod the frontier oi.' an 
i:tport�nt ally to the Himalaya Mountni."ls and by the same 
portion enhanced 3nglish power and influsnca in India. 
It sem.1s th::it th<-' ::·11gl1sh posi tLin cu.n bo cxplai:ied and 
justified only �n the grounds of politic�l e�pediancy. 
The r:ohilla '.'1ar cr�o.ted a Ciangerous precedent for the 
f'11ture. 
Another incident that furthe:.· d1scre:l1 ted Hastings 
--·--··--�-··-·--·------··-·-_..... ____ ,._ ... _ ____ _ 
14 
and the English in India was the First Ma.ratha Wal" 
which was forced upon Hastings b:,' tbs bungling intu­
ference or the governors ot Bombay and Madras. The 
consequence of this conflict, uhich resulted in a 
terr1 tor1al sh.ma. -�'llq, was to antagonize f'urther Anglo• 
Indian relations and. nagnify Maratha apprehension and 
distrust of the Eng lish. A final source of friction wa1 
the addition of the territory at Be�es to English 
dominions, the only such acquisi t:ton during the rule ot 
Hastings. The Govarnor-Genernl had demanded financial 
support from the Raja of Benares, Cheit Sengh, and in 
failing to galn such support deposed the Raja e.nd e:xact•4 
tributl'l t'rom the R'lja•s successor. The methods used by 
Hastings were much to his discredit and Cr.used considerable 
criticism in England.12 
Lord Cornwallis (1786-93) �.rrived in !mt.a with 
the intention of pursuing a policy similar to that or bis 
predecessor. Contrary to his hopes and r;i.uch to hia 
reluctance, Cornwallis was forced :!.nto a milit2r7 contlict 
with the Tlppu of Hy sore, who, �dthout provocs.tion1 
attacked tha English ;'rotectorate of Travanc(")re with the 
purpose of exterminating the English from India. 13 
Cornwallis porsonally com:landed an army 11hich succeeded in 
gaining the submission of the Tippu. The terms of peace 
12a1e1g, �-s.lt ..... , P• 1+17. 
13 Mill, QR., __ ill.u. Vol. V, p.237. 
r--
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granted the English one-halt of the Tippu•s territory 
and a heavy 1ndemn1 ty. Considerable criticism. arose u 
a result of the expedition, but from the viewpoint ot 
sel.1'-cletense Basting's actions were totally justifiable. 
Signitica.nt]Jr the English had won the eternal animos1tr 
1'+ of the Tippu and his followers. 
Sir J'obn Shore ( 1793•98) replaced Cornwallis. 
Shore was not well qualifiecl nor did he exhibit much 
ab111t7 tor the position of Governor..Oenel'al. He refueed 
to accept responsibilit7, was extl'emel.J cautious an4 
exoept tor one rare occasion in tbs ease of Oudh, totall.J 
lacked cour age and aggressiveneas. English prestige in 
India undoubtedl7 suffered as a consequence ot Shore's 
inaction which created. considerable disrespect tor English 
power and the general feeling that the English were on 
the defensive. 
The policy of retraining from territorial 
expansion that oharacter1sed the Hastings•, Cornwallis' 
and Shore's regimes was terminated am reversed by the 
latters successor, Lord Morington (1798·1805). Wellesl•J 
deliberately associated himself with a policy ot ex• 
pansion which was in part motivated by events in Europe 
where Napoleon1s rise to power and an omnipresent Franoe 
poised a dangerous threat to English possessions in India. 
The distinct poss1b111t7 ot a Fl'anco•Ini1an Alliance wou14 
-- .,., .. _ .. ---· -- --,·------· -- -·-�-----
llt-I . ,.., bid., P• 320. 
17 
m�,ny n.::.tivo :u•mie:i corrtah1ad French o:f'f1ce:-s. Wellosley 
roalizod the 1mpracticab111ty of an Anzlo-Indian ,�llianc• 
beco.usa or the obvious unrel1EhiJ1 ty ryf th;i n�tiV"l rular&J 
thoreforo, the '�nly ulternc:tive remai'ling was to se�ure 
i; .Snglish de facto ccntrol :ver t�.10 nntive states. 
Tho first nativo state to :rctcc1t.:ib tc the :n.ew 
e�.gagou in a c·.J.aspi:racy i.ith the l''r;:inch fr".'lc v.ho!!l he had 
i·ocsive� aiu. '.ellesley decl:ieu to elimi:::::.te this 
poter ... tial danger to tho English. In the brief l{y::Jore 
campaign the I:.nglish dei'eatc:d Tippu, and Mysore was 
partioned ar:1ong the native states and Sn£;land ·.-11th the 
16 
latter receivi:ci..; the lion's share. Only e. s1!a11 :)a.rt 
of the '�ysore state was : -'U'mttted to ret�in sy11•bolic 
i·'.1depende:-1ee. The r·�nglt sh B.cquist t1.on of Mysore lett the 
Hart'!.thas as the on1y indep•1mdont pnwer in the Dei�hnn. 
Ft'rther aeonisi tfrns were made when the au.estions . . 
'!he En�;lish err·ntP.c't roco::;ni t1on of certa'n e1a1monts to 
Wellesley terminated n policy ot duHl government 
_________ ... .,,.,,-�· . ...,._.--�-------· ..... -,¥--- ,, ..- ... . _._ ... ....... ,.._......_ 
l' 
F. w. Buckler "The Political Theory of th• 
In
.
din:l Mutiey, 11 fra.t1sacti{ns �4 1ibi Bgyal Uis ftgricaJ. 
,a.Q.d.m Vol. V JanuAry, 922 , p.90. 
16os�cJJ_, Q!t, c:!.t., Vol. III, P• 67. 
18 
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ovt:J1• the Carna ... ie in 1301, b�cause of a c�upir•a.cy o:f 
tllg liawab with thtd EJsor·l• Stato.17The Nawall vf the 
Curriutic was pcnsiorn:i,; • 
With most of South£�n India sacurel.y uuder 
Eriglt::: :. ccutrol ·::ollesley rivated his attention. on the 
importune. sts:�o cir OuJh. The Goveruor--G;;sneral concluded 
that 1'.:; W<--;s necessal'y to i·educe the ,::.ilitar;1 ro1·ces or the 
g:.•eat ti1crease in ezpense .-;:1lch '1:ellesley propo:.:;ed to 
defray by a subsidy; :1:.::1ely, the cession or Hohilkhand. 
The tfo.wab, Ja:;J.;:;.t L! .. i, v-1;.;o:·c.iusly p.rotcstod; but powor• 
les3 to rosist, ha accluiosceC. to the Sngli.:;h d0mands.18 
the Mara.th.a States whe.1.»3 in.cessuut civil war had raged 
siuce tha lieclixl.e o.f �·oGul i.utlueuee. Imposl·�iou of the 
. E.:iglitilJ. sy::; teu, -:>a tiw .Iax·a�ha 3 tates w,.iulJ be qui to 
adva;:1tageo\l.S in that 11; ·would bring peace to this area, 
gual\;wtae StiCW.'ity o! ;;ugllsh possessL;ns, ali.J.•late a 
fuliLU'a potliln�ial tl.i.�:eat to E•l�lish supraiaacy in India, 
an<l nullity a possible Frencll a.111.:ulce. An iaxcellent 
wban, :Baj1, Ilao, the nominal hea\l of the i>i.aratha Coni'ederacy, 
was dethi'Ol'l.Od in a civ 5.l war, precipitated by a disputl:ld 
17 .llWl·' p. 68. 
H3T1-iornt!)n, on.t. J�.i .. t.•, p. 266. 
20 
succession. Tbs Peshwa envisioned his political career 
as being terminated unleas be could retri eve his t ol"JllGr 
position by an alliance with the English, and so the 
Engli sh and Peshwa, tor totally different motives, becaae 
allies on terms that the Peshwa w ould be rest or ed as b.ea4 
ot the Msratha Contederacy and in return accept an English 
subsidiary force . A brief war ensued, and as a result 
the English acquired numerous territories , among them 
Doab on the Northern Fr ont ie r and l'.attalt on the East coast 
ot India. The consequene•s were s1gn1t1eant in that the 
English now had a defensible f'J>ont1ar in Hindustan az:d 
unbroken teritories trom Bengal to the southern most 
part of India. The English also gained tremendous 
political adYantage in t he control ancl guardianship of 
the Mogul Emperor who exercised conside rable latent 
19 
polit ical influence. 
Thus Wellesley vastly inereased English political 
and milita.rJ influence 1n India, but like his pre dec essors 
he multiplied the latent discontent, oppositiont and. 
desire tor revenge against English usurpation ot natiT• 
power and position. 
Op position to Wellesley's polic7 in England caused 
his reca11.20Lort C ornwallis (1805) temporaril.1 resU111e4 
London a 
19 Oswell, op. ;1t., Vol. lY., P• 72. 
20 Earl or Rosberyl %/;J W.f1l•!l'¥ P!p9r1 
Herbert Jenkins, 91 , ol. , P• 77. 
(2 vols. I 
21 
the position but died atter a tew months ot service. 
Sir George Barlow (1805'•07) then succeed.ad to the position 
ot Governor..Oeneral and i n  turn was sueeeeded b7 tort 
Minto (1807·13). Wellesle7• s three illtnediate successors 
effected a reversal or the polic7 ot expansion w1 th one 
minor exception when in 1810, the Mauritius Islands.were 
21 conquered. 
This bl'1et period ot retrenchment was tel'lllinated 
by the new Governor-General, Lord Hastings, (1813 .. 23) 
who illlt19diately faced the problem ot Gurkhs. encroachments 
trom Nepai.22Th1s resulted in a conflict in which the 
English acquired considerable territor7 west of the Kali 
River. Hasting's most significant aocompl1sbment was 
the subjugation ot the Maratha Conte4eracy by bringing 
under English control the states of Sinchia, Nagpur, and 
Holkar.23 
Lord Amherst (1823•28) was also forced into a 
conflict that resulted. in a reluctant and expensive 
2>+ extension of English tvritozy, In the First Burmese war 
(182lt·26) the English acquired Assam, Arakan, and 
Tenasserim. Tba English had now created on their eastern 
frontier a potential threat . 
21 
Mills , �c;.U.., Vol.VII., P• 230. 
221Ja.l.A..' vol . VIII, P• ;3. 
2
3IW• t P• 15'7. 
?4 
- Oswell, gn, c1t4, Vol.III, P• 113. 
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The administration ot Governor..Oeneral Lord 
Bentinck (1828-35) manifested tremendous impact on the 
Sepoy Rebellion. Bentinck expounded a new principle to 
justify annexation or the states or Mysore and Coorg, 
namely that the existing governments wero corrupt anl 
inhumane. The justification proved to be most popular 
as a method and excuse for g aining .control of native 
states. A second principle Bentinck applied to the state 
of Kachar was the "Doctrine or Lapse" which the future 
Governor..Oeneral Dalhousie used most ruthlessly. 
Lord Bentinck1s successor, Lord Auckland (1835• 
42) immediately became involved in the infamous A:fghan 
war. Persia, because of active support an1 encouragement 
from Russia, had assumed an aggressive and belligerent, 
attitude toward the E:nglish in India. In order t.o 
discourage potential Persian aggression Lord Aucklard 
proposed to create a strong, st�hle, and reliable 
government in Af'ghanistan. The objective could be best 
accomplished by de i)&cto control of the Afghan government 
which was precisely what Auckland proposed. Dost Mohomed, 
who headed the Afghanistan government, was considered b7 
the English to be unreliable and tickle' hence, Auckland 
favored h is replacement with an English protege, Shah 
25 
Shuja. 
The English in 1839 ''<ffected the conquest of 
25 Holmes, on, ci�., P• 28. 
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Atghanistan, in a war that was almost proh1b1t1vel.7 
expensive in terms ot manpower and mone7, nm enthroned 
Shah Shujn ns rnja. The Govornor..Oeneral now made a 
ratc.l 'blunder• His ratuso.l to wi thdro.w Lnglish troope 
even after tho �onquest put tho entire country in n 9tate 
26 of torment and rebellion. Disaster now plagued the 
English troops in their efforts to suppress the rebellion, 
and 1 t appeared as 1.f the English army would outter 
complete dateat it not annihilation and suffer irreparable 
loss ot prestige. 
The si tua.t1on brought ,,-,bout Aucltland. • s replace­
me�t with Lord Ellenborough (1842-44). cillenborough 
organized a relief expedition to regain Kabul and recoup 
lost English prostigo. The English were euccesstul in 
their efforts and succoeded in aecomplishing an honorable 
withdrawa.1.27 Despite the final success ot English Al'ml 
the prima.r7 objective ot the Afghan War was abortive, and. 
tormer ruler Dost Mohomed resumed power. Tho Afghan Wu 
is signiticant because it dealt a damaging blow to 
English prestige and arms ard destroyed the legend&U7 
(London1 
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image ot 1nv1cibility. One writer pictures the Afghan 
at.fair as tha mo9t Ullqu:il1£1ed bluooer committed in the 
whole h istory of the I:nglish in India. 2
8 
A direct consequence of the Af'ghan war was the 
an.11axat1on ot ·andh in lC-4 3. Tho annexation, though 
defended as necessary to the welfare of the 1n ha.b1tant129 
and because of the risk ot an Afghan invasion, was probably 
due ::!ore to the deniro to regain prestige lost by the 
A:fchan af'f'air. The c'"se of G1ndh exemplifies the one . 
instance in which it is d1£t1cult to believe th=it the 
case tor nnnexat1on was not �ore or less deliberately 
manufactured, in opposition to the declared sentiments 
of the nost high-minded, capable, n!ll well 1n.f'ornte4 
serv.a.nts of the Government,30 
Sir Henry llardinr,e (1841+..t+:') desired to bring 
pea.ee and socur1ty to Indio. c11d to terminate tho lorg 
series or wars, but 11 ':e most ot his predecessors t he 
Governor-General was plagued by war. The P.ardinge 
administr"tion differed s1en1f'ioantly and e.ppreciabl,y 
tr0:-u previous sdm1n1strnt�ons in that the First S1h!t 
War t10.s forced upon him much to his reluctance. A 
Sihk a ttac1t on Firoznur preeipi tnted the conf'liot in 
28 A. D. Innes, S?J2,,...£11., P• 237. 
29Im1:1h, QP• s:it,, P• 24. 
30 A. D. lnnas, 2,R9 c!l•t P• 250. 
\!!hieh th• &nglilfh wve vtotoriou. lia:rdinae DOW 
ma.ntfeste<l hla s1neere desire tor pea.. br at1;empttn.c 
to ettect a ju.st and stable &'O'f•l"lllSt ill the PuQJaia.31 
Cutainl7 U He.rd1llt9 4erd.red to a:'llft the Punjab thftN 
was sutttcieat Just11'toa.t1on, t:u.1t th1a path ot a:pauton 
be ignored and alloved. tm Punio to Ntatn its 
in4epenJ.enoe w1 th tau wa.rrd.ng er the eone•q'IHtnet•• � 
misrule and renll'Wed op.POS1t1on to ·th• E.ucliaht 
Hud:!nge ntired hola tnd1a tn J1nrn}lil17 ot J.8lt8, 
conflient that be had �ueathff to nts eueooasof't Loa 
Dalhousie (l.8l+S•;6) un ca ot peace and 1eourtt1. 
llard1np assured. Dalhousie on bis 4opartu.re that lt vou.14 
be unnecessary to rs.re a shot in In41& tor sevaal Yed'I 
in the i'utve.32 Ironiccl!J penoe la•ted o:lf thl',�• montha 
after the c:leparture ot fu:t.rdinee. nevolutlt'n ccoVN4 at 
MooltM in. tbe P\ln.Jab in Aprll Of 18\i.St when two lnglitll 
oftioers, UeutelltUat Aoles� and a:·. Van.s A.&:nev• ..,.. 
lllU'de:roo..33 Engl1eb Co�da•in..Ch1ef, toi-4 Uagh GO'lllbt 
su, pressed th• rebellion• kl10wn u the seca Sikh vo. 
In Merch ::it 18491 att•r tba t'ail.w:e ot an ettort to oreaw 
-- .. !II ,. ... 
31.robn w. lt!U'•, A..JI1uan ot Jl1\fl �"'o:r; J!at 2-8 
1nd1a. (3 vols.1 U>nioru w,n.AUen &: Co., l f9'•93)1 Vol 11 
p;r. 
32John ri .• R. HuTiott1 b �ltb kl iPilta 
(O.xtOl"d.1 Clahndon Preast 1932}, 1>-l • 
3lx.,,e, Al• altitt P• 20 
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a stable al¥1 nl1able goYe:rment 1n. the Punj&bt llslboUte 
annend the terl1.toq. Prior to tbe SQond Sikh Wdt 
Dalhousie had been ad•er•• to tlal poller ot anna:at1on, 
but after that ft'cmt he i-•aliaed that: tt waa the onl.J 
teu1ble p0Ue7 an4 stated tbatt 
While deeplJ' eent1ble ot the respons1l)111111 
I baft aas\lllllld1 I be.Y• an un4oubt1ng oonv1ot1on 
or the e:apedieno7, the .tuetioe, am the 
neeee111t1 ot 117 aet. What I have 4one, 1 haY• done With a el.ear oc,nsetonoe, and. in tne honest 
b•liet that 1t was trap•a.t.1Y•l.7 4emande4 ot me 
b1 � duty to the State.,,... 
The P'.mj.ab was place4 undN" the oontrol ot a trium'Wirat•t 
OOflpo"4. ot, RenrJ' Le.v:renee, John tawrenoe, and RoliHtrt 
Montcom.G'J v1tb John tavl'ence t:lna.111 aa!ning complaw 
powu ln tbe Punjab• The Jilnllleh tm1ler tbe en114htene4, 
capable, an4 '�thte rule of the Lawrence 'brothen 
1n:tro4uoe4 in the Punjab nut!Gl"OU retorma., nt-t ¥&1 thU 
suoees1tul admtntstration that na.4e the PUl'ljab vbat t.t 
became 1n tbl troubleeoa de.11 of the Mu.tinyt the Sa•l• 
Prow1nc• ot India. al!> one imponant eon••quence t>t the 
seoon4 SS.kb ¥Jar was Doat Mnhomed*s ncogntti�n ot the 
peJ"manent, dominant an4 11l\'1nolble position ot the Encll•h 
in In41a1 and 10 ht desired a tHatf with tb• DalbQtutl• 
CO"l"nmct whlobwu stgl184 tn 1855'. tt was thia tree.tr 
wb1ch prelfenta an,r 41sturbanoe on tb.4t fl!onttu during the 
se1>07 Revol'\ • 
__....�.-.......... ......... _...__., ____ ._____ . ____ _ 
Y+oswe11, QP• qU,., Vol. 1, P• io. 
3'Holm••t a •• ,,,,., lh 32. 
I 
I 
I 
CARNATIC:I ANO • MYSORE ! 
.A.9001' 1780 I Seate. I Inch • 105 M� J 
('I 
0 
------- - - -
N 
... 
• 
<( 
0 
28 
The acqUis1t1on of the Punjab like uacy other 
extensions or •:ngl1sh territory was forced upon a 
i�elueto.nt govarnnent I howova:r, "It was tho o ne step 1n 
his (Dalhousie) remorsoloss enreer of annexation that 
36 needed no apo logy. such cannot be acclaimed concerning 
the other acquisitions or ualhous1o which w ere ot an 
entirely different nature, al'll excited more controversy 
than the actions of aey Govornor-Goneral since Warren 
IIastin;:s. 
Dalhousie revived two principle policies, the 
"Doctrine ot Lapse", ani annexation bocnuso ot mis• 
government. The romer was more f'raquent ly used am 
erented most disaffectio::. A cardinal corner stone ext 
Hindu religious faith teaches tha.t a man can only escape 
punishment in the herentter by having a son to otte 
sacrifice to his soul. Thus a ruler without natural 
heirs cherished the pr1v11e��e or adopting a son who would 
pre£orra such a sacred duty. no,1evor, it was the political 
aspect or this practice thnt c�used much friction because 
many rulurs ndo:�tod a son not only tor religious r easons 
but also tor the purpose ot prepat1:;9�iag their d)'tlasties . 
Though it vas an accepted custo:;1 that such a.n adopted 10n 
--- --···-------
36 Os;.;ell, on. cit., P• U. 
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could inherit private and personal propertr .37 it was 
olearlf understood that a son oould not inherit a 
prineipaltt7 without the sanction of the paramount powel'.38 
Dalhousie ' s  predeces s or s  had practiced this policy 
according to their individual desire s ,  but it was under 
Dalhousie that the idea was used on an unprecedented scale. 
Dalhousie wrote on this subj ect• 
I take this titting occasion or recording m, 
s trong and deliberate opinion , ,  th.at , in tM 
exercise of a wise and sound policy, the British 
government is bound not to put aside or neglect 
such rightful opportunities or acquiring 
territory or revenue as may trom time to time 
present themselves1 whether they arise tl'om the 
lapse ot subordinate atates by the failure ot 
all heirs ot every 4esor1pt1on whatsoever, or trom the failure ot heirs natural where the 
suooes11on can be sustained on11 tr the saction 
ot the government being give to the ceremo117 of 
adoption according to Hindoo law. The goverment 
i s  bound in dut1 , a1 well as policy , to act oa 
eve�1 such occasion with tbs purest integrity, 
and in the most scrupulous observance of good 
faith. Whenever a shadow of doubt can be shown, 
the claill should at once be abandoned, Bllt, where 
the right to territory bt lapse is cle ar, the 
government 11 bound to t ake tbat which is justl1 
and legally due, and t o  extend to that territOl'y 
the benefits ot our sovereigntyt _ present and 
prospective. In 11ke manner, wns.le l would not 
seek to la.1 down anY inflexiole rule with respec• 
to adoption, I hold. that1 on all occasions, 
where heir s  natwal shall. ta111 the territOZ'J' 
should be ma.de to lapse , and aa.option s hould n°' 
be permitted , excepting in those cases in which 
some strong political reason may rander it 39 expedi ant t o  depart from this general rule. 
3711ar:r1ott , op. cj.t., P •  153 .  
38McLeod Innes ,Jbe sepqy l\aoU ( Londons A.D, Innes & Oo•t  1897) ,  p, 
39 � Holmes ,  op, c_!1, , P• 3�· 
Prev1oua GoveionaPl..Oenorala ot W1a had 'bffA 
p.rooe to ainta1u local nat1vo d�f.aa ties <ltlia.r than in 
�pti.:>na.l caseu am to Jutige eaoh caae on 1t• O"vlJl 
�er1ts� Dalhousie ' s  9redoceasor1 bad acteQ on tho 
genual prineiple t>f avoiding annaat1on lt possS.bl•t 
but JaU:v.>as1e acted on th• contl:B.1'1 pr1no1ple ot 
annexation 1.t 1t eoa.1.J be done le1it1matel.1. Th• EnsUeb 
1n lnhori ting the PaJ'&m'.;.un t power in Irdla h1lll thl 
degenerate Hogul &mpil'e also �.rited a principle 
ex�1s•d b1 tho Mogul 1>:mp1re in which onl.1 tbe pua.mount 
powu C".>Ul4 1s.netion political 1nha1ta.nc•• 
n.. man.? 01>portwdtie1 ot ai.mexat1® durina 
the :0.1lhousl• a411 nt•tration may he divided into ca�•• 
11\Vol'ftn&t (a) laps•, ('b) m.tsacvern.:ttent , (o ) agar•tulon 
asunot Iktlgl1eb. dominion1 . 'l'h•H vue nar.uezoua 
a,;,tillaatL1ns ot the "l>oOtriM of Laps•n• the f'1i-tt HinC 
tb.t prino1pal1t1 o.� Satua in l.Nt vh.1ch ha4 'bffft 
created 1)Ut of thi3 Maratha C(n1tsdeiac1 tn the eaz11 
nineteenth eentuz7. The ruler on h1s 4eath•be4 a4ol"td 
an h•h' t a meth<>d not recogn1 aed. bf the EngUsht h.enoe, 
Dalhoul• demanded t:bat th41t1on be adhered to and IO 
ltO 
Satd'a lapeed to the B.nglt•h• 
.&. IMOlld case ill"lolve4 the state of SaabalP'W 
-wherct the rulv 414 not prort.4• an bell' on P'U'pO•e 
lmoW1ng thlt ten1 to1'J' woul.4 It to tbAI E1\gli1h from vhtob 
the people would Mllet1t• ftml tb.e quutlon Gt 14op•t.• 
....,.._.,...._..,., __ . _,. ____ � ............. --------·------
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414 no• a1M Md the tel'l'itGrr waa pftottcall.7 M­
ltl queathe4 to the k-ll•h• 
A th11Cl ca.M a.roe• in Jb$ne1 in 18'3• the rula 
lea•1n1 0011 an adopted heu. Tba cauntr)" bad b6tm. nl.C 
in such a negativ• 1' uh1on in th• prev1CQt th11'1ty ,eua 
that Dal.howl!.• decided to aaauma control. The rala•• 
w14ow vas PM•1onedt an act which tilled ha VS.th bltt• 
l.� , 
a.'limoeit)' toward the :Bnglioh. · ··11u1 stat•• or lr1saa 184 
Sc1nd.9 met a similar tate to:r lf.D t' eaaou . 
ADOthC' s1gnit1cwit ctl• was tmt or Baapu.a-1 
annexod 1n l.8S'3t wJ.ch vas tho Jllt(JG t important or tu 
31'.atllls 1n t� ut t;oritory. '.L'ho :·u.lw lot't no Mtwal 
01· ad.C"',.itsJ heir• • :Trut que5t1on ot adoption .u'Os• vbc 
one o!' the rular• s  utdows desired to .:.dopt a :ion who 
·.;ou.ld swcecd to tho thl·ane ; hvttevor, DalhousU! oppoael 
the art1ticr.l recreation :>t the atate \Ulder thia oondtttal 
nnd lfagpur tell tnto lapae .43 
Perbap:s tho m�st  zit;nitleant or t he  vru-iooe •••• 
i.'lVOl'fi:.lt: tb.e "Docb"1ne of LapH'' wo.a tbe c :::�d oJ: D\1n4tl 
Pan.th or tho ffa.n& S�.1 l>. nano. Sahib 'l.1:CS the adoptttl •• 
of BcJ1 - Hao, toroorJ.:; .Peshua, who l:md been detbr� '1 
Lorll titwt i  i,SS ror h�' a �oa.chor-J .  ·�''he ?esh.;n we.a "'1"'­
an a pvia1o.n ot ao, ooo ;;ounds par year an<i on his 4-th f.n 
1+1 A. D. lnnea, �P• -�lbt P• 285'. 
i.� 111 -i., 'P ·  282. 
t.t. 3ta,.., ?ll•"· Jl1L., "'• ?7 • 
32 
1856 was c:uite wealthy .  liana Sahib irilierited the wealth 
but al.so desired the pension which t he English denied h1a. 
The Nana navar forgave the Eri.glish for what he considered 
a flagrant v iolr,t ion of justice , and when the opportuni'Q' 
arose he effected a ghastly revenge during the S epoy 
Hebe111on at the Mas sacre of C a·lnpore .ltlt-
ln the second category involving misgovernment 
the most 1mportan� case Wa$ t hat of Oudh which had a 
repeated history or misrule and a equal nwaber ot Inglish 
varntngs of the consequences . Finally Colonel Outram, 
English resident in Oudh , submitted a report tn ia;.i., 
regarding misrule in Oudh . Thus on Februery 13, 185'6 
the territory of OUdh was a.Maxed by proclamat ion. 
Dalhousie wrote s  
I respect!'ully submit tha t  the time has come 
when inaction on tbe part of the British 
go•ernment in re lation to the af':faire of t he  
Kingdom of Oudh c an  now no longer just1t'ie4, 
and inact ion is already OOff!erting our 
responsibiltt7 into guilt / 
It was Oudh which was the seat of the Sepo7 Rebellion 
and thue "most direct in it s bearing upon t he Mutin,y was 
the annexation ot the Moham..':l!edan Kingdom or Oudh . "� 
In the third categor7 or forced acquisitions was 
the territor7 gained as a consequence or the Second Burmese 
........,., _ _  . ... _ ..,_.. _ __ . _ __ .. ___ _  . __ .... _____ __ .. ........._. ... _ .  ___ , _ ___ _ 
44 A .  D .  Innes , op. cit,.., p .  ?.B ? .  
4�oswell, �git., p.  10. 
46 Marriott , on. cit. , P• l!)lt. 
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war . Anglo-Burmese relations ha4 graduallJ det•r1ora.te4 
as a result ot' tba 8t:lmeae tailun to abide b1 the 
prO'f1s1ent ot the 'l'HatJ ot 1826, and th• harrasement ot 
Bl:lgltsh MJ'Obant1 b7 the &lrtlleff . The English, tailing 
to get ,1ust eompeneat1on and 1at1ataot1on from A•a1 went 
to vu 1n 18'2. Rancoon eot:>n tell 1 0  the lngll1b tn AP1."11 
an4 the loveml>el' eonqueet ot hgu oonelu4e4 th• va. 
The terntor-7 ot Pegu vu annexed bJ Ddhou1te, Who ball 
ao altornat1••• by prool.amat1on and. vt.thowd a foria1 
lt7 veat1 OJ' aeceptanee by the .4Ya goYGl'l'llUll'• 
The 18'"6 annaat1on ot OUdh wu tbe laat •l• 
&naUsh tenttonal aoqut.ettton 1n India tmi•1at•ll' 
prio&" to the etan ot the Sepoy !lttbe1Uon ot 1851. P:ra 
1757 to l.8S1 the lnall•h had Tattl.J' enen4ed theU Indian 
Blllpin. Bach year espau1on geinecl momenta an4 by tM 
tlae ot Dalhouale lin.Clish poa1es11ons tn In41a 40\lblect. 
The eon .. quenee ot tbia oentu>7 fl'om Clln to 
Dalhousie waa to onate a lawn' 4••P•aeated hoet111tJ' 
tovar4 the a.b1qu1toua powv of the i!tngUsb.  '1'bt enhane._ 
.ment ot EngUah poU'tlcal pave meant a pl'oportione.te 
ml P"C1p1'8nt teou.n. 1n the power ot the nattw nle••• 
Thi• English usurpation ot nattn power oreated _.. 
enemt.ea vho sought l'ftenge and des1:red to neoup tbeu 
traclltlonal powv1 . b;I_.,� was an umixe4 
31t 
ble 111ng to the w•ak and misruledf but to the dominate 
political class the benefits were leas obYious . It wu 
preci sely this 1egm91t ot Indian societ7 that was 
alienated and potentiall.7 most dangerous. 
The English attempted to cushion the shock � 
dethronement b7 a liberal pension. lmmediatal7 priOJ' 
to t he  Sepo;y Rebellion the King ot Delhi was reoei'fing 
i;o,ooo pound s par 7ear 1 the Nawab of Calcutta ,  '160 ,0001 
ot Madras , 116 , 0001 the families ot Bycler and 'l'ippu, 
63 , 000J the Peshwa of the Marathas , 80, 000J and others 
i,;oo,ooo pounds per year. 48rnough maey ot thl monarchl 
rendered politically impotent b7 the English were plaoe4 
on liberal pensions , this did not pacify their thirst 
tor political power. !he pension also became a souree 
ot trouble as d14 the usurpation and denial ot political 
power. The English alienated tuture generatione-•the 
Nana Sahib being an excellent case in point--and the 
affection of entire families .  Thus was a broad an4 
s1gn1tioant base ot discontent provided. 
the natives viewed the incessant English advance 
with alarm, tear and. distrust .  The English unwtttingl.1' 
created a popular image ot having an insatiable appetite . 
It 1s aptly se.14 tha t the "British government vu 
unpopular preciselJ' in proport ion to its restraining 
l+8 . 
Alexander Heylin ( ed . )  ""'"le S epoy Rebellion" 
Lqpdon Q».llttzlv bJ1ey1 Vol . n I-II : octob er ,  185'7 ) ,  
p .  32. 
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force • "  49 Thus m.uJ the political basis n::-:d roundo.tion 
for the Sepo,y ltobollion partially created. 
49 , D· I it 300 '' • • nnos, gn.. c .,, P •  • 
CUAPTD II 
Tmi: SIPOI A,lU4,'f 
Cloa•l.1 eoaneote:l V1 th the :.rl•• ot BQIU.ab 
4cmd.nton in In41a waa the di1attect1r:n that pa4ull.1' 
oose among the native Sepo7 tJ>Oops vblob oonsttt1lted 
a large tract ton ot the t&tal Brll l•h toHes in lnlta • 
!bough. the 14ea. of a native � ortg1nate4 
wt.th th• Fl'eaoh, th• &ngliah 1oon •PloYe4 the S.4••• 
The tint sepoy tttooi>• wee l"aiae4 by the English 1n 
southern India near Ma4ras and � during th• l:il+0•1 
am 1'75'1''1.1 Ortctnallf theff 'lrHtr• f'•v !n numb•· ., 
wh9n it was rea11.a tba.t the S9P01a coulcl be pownttal.17 
uaetu.1, thetr numbers v•t ine:reaeect u vere their 
respona1b111ttea. 
�&en Cltve llal'Cbed on Calcutta, there '"'•" 
tounee native 'battal1ons stationed tn Madras , mabutng 
about 10,000 J.Nn, tw!'.> oa"altona ot wbtch wen ued on 
the Calcutta mf.ae1on. A.tW. ti. &ll leh eoaqueat of 
Bengal and the &"1e ot Plaaeey, 1n which an• battalf.oa 
37 
o£ Bengal Sepo71 pal"t1o1pate4, nattve troopa ba4 POVD 
to nineteen baUallou or about 19,000 JHQ.2 
Tb4t tiret nt4enoe of a nttnoue ep11'it ooounel 
in 179t 1n l:iengal vtsea the .:; •P<>1S imagined the1 wen being 
denied prue monq Justl.7 deaerv«l. 1'lw sepoya w•• 
conoeded thell' shal'u ot tba prla• aon-r, but nen th.a 
certatn ngtmenta m.anttested sed1t1ou conaptrac7 and 
tbe rebellion waa eventuall.7 quelled b7 a court• inasttlal 
vhteh tmpon4 deatt penaltie1 on tvenv-tour .-., th• 
execution ot which was foreeably wttnoated by ta... 411• 
&.raed rebelliOUI Sep07 VOOPl•J Tld.a clectei'fe aacl 
Wlbe1ttattnc ae,ion ot the ti:llgllsll betgbtene« the S•poJ" 
na,.et tor power and authol'tty. 
A 1t.gldttcatt  obange ln th4 S epo1 d'l'f/I/ vu brought 
abott  b7 the Reorgantza:tt.on A.ot ot 1796, 'lrlh.1ch had tbl 
effect ot tnereaatng . the number of �ll!!h ottieert tn tbe 
Sep07 Regilllents an4 by the aama pol't1on 4"reaa1QS tbl 
lntluenea and position ot the native ott10era W.tob. we.n 
nov aelectad on the bast.1 ot aen10l"1 t;y or aomtaeion rathel' 
' 
than merit or expat.,noe . The act also caused poattlona 
ot autbel'1'1 '° b• uerct1-4 by r::.ngU.sh otttoea unfit t• 
Hsponstbtl1'1 •  Tm close Hlat1 oosh1::i between native 
troop• ancl 8ngllah ott1oes dltappeared am ... l'•place4 
--�----------------------------- ----..-..- -----
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b1 dlecontent on the pan o£ native ott1eer1, lll8D7 at 
i.. 
vbom loat tneir pos:l.ttona. The toun4as ot tlM nattft 
aJ'm1' raeru1ted the SepoJ aol41oe t:rom among thoee 1n 
subjugation. ottif:era W4re ehoaen trom. h1gblr aoctal 
poettion and high-cute H1n4us . As tho ott1cer positions 
held. b7 natives 4eerea1Md and that ot :Slngl1ah 1noreaff4, 
41sat'fect1on a.rose . The whole oharacta ot the native 
army waa changed becaue• opriortunitr tor 418t1nction 
oeased and ttt. nat1'98 otftoer1 beetllle <>n'.11 nominal 
lead••• 
Another 4egeneret1ng tntluenoe was the per1cd 
ot protracted peaee that followed th9 Mfsore and Karatba 
War•• 'the latter yeus dt t ha  eighteenth cent1l17' d 
early yeu1 ot the nineteenth cent'Ol'J vu. cbaractertael 
by 1ucce1sive rdlitar1 eontlicte tn '4h1ch the F.ngltah v•n 
vtotoril.'Al• and ln whiob tlw native Sepe)' tl'OOpa aerYed 
wtth 41st1nct1on an4 attained the height of thou alorr. 
However, tn the poat-Maratha war era, m111tary etagnatton 
and -11sh 4e!4al'l41 on the native troope to adopt we1tua 
1novat1ona and id11t!ll'Y ntorma , reoulte4 in the 
detorioration ot sepo7 morale and the growth of dia• 
atreetton. 
tho Madru �. becau!.Ul ot it s composi tion, vu 
pal''icnlarl7 host ile to the Snnovat1oo which :1nclucte4 tll8 
abolition of the cH.1ttngu11h1ng llUU'ka <:I oaato worn • 
--·�-...------ ---------- --------------------
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t he forehe ad ,  e limination ot ear-rings 1n which th e 
Sepoys were tondly attached, and requiremen ts to shave 
and wear a special head-dress .  Change in head-dress 
was an explosive innovation in t hat it w as not only 
symbolic or Christianity bnt was also an abomination in 
that 1 t was made from either t he skin of cattle or swine 
both of which were sacred to  t he H1nd.U and Mohammedan 
� respectively. Thus English reforms caused discontent; 
among Hindu as well as Mohaillllle4an aI¥l united otherwise 
irreconcilable enemies in comm.on caus e .  It  was not 
difficult for the S epoys to imagine and suspect that 
these innovations were subtle methods of converting them 
to Christianity and. assimilating them into westem 
culture. 
In July of 1806 these nUlllerous gri evances , great• 
ly magnified and aggravated b7 agitator s ,  exploded into 
violenoe a.t For t Vellore . Thus was the second r..1n.jor 
6 
Indian mutiny precipitat ed .  The Eng lish troops at 
Vellore numbered only four companie s , the massacre ot 
which was followed by plunder and destruction .  The 
disaffection at Velloro soon spread to v ariou s  othe r 
Sepoy detachments 1n the Carnatic and news arrived at 
A.rcot trom whence Colonel Gillespie led a rescue mission 
'-Mill, 2J2., _ _fil. , Vol .  III, P• 92 . 
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ot Engli sh and native troops aga1 1st t he mutineer s . 
Though the r ebellion was crushed , considerable 
disaffection remained nmong the Sepoy troops � 
Discontent was not confined to Vellora , the 
C arnatic and Mysore but also spread to thl!I Dekhan an! 
Hyberabad , the capi tal o f  the N1Y.am ' s  dominio ns . In 
Hyberabad t he  troops showed s imilar grievances as those 
at Vellor e ,  and these wer e greatly magnified and made 
more intolerable by the recent arrival of a new 
cor::ma.ndar , C olonel Mcntresor , whose ignorance ot Inclian 
cus toms only inflan10d the s1 tuat ion . When Colonel 
l11ontr esor he ard 0f the events at Vellor e ,  he re s cinded 
recent obnoxious orders ; but the arrogant Sepoys still 
'D�ife sted di scontent and attet1)ted to g ain new 
concess inns . D ecis ive :;,;ng lish ac ti on prevented further 
7 
disturbanc e e.nd the s ituation contin�l.ed to sir:u'ier . 
Fresh trouble arose at Nundydroog in nysore in 
October of 1806 , but a premature Engli sh knowledge ot 
tbe pr.::>:;iosed con spiracy and the re.pid ll.I'rival of' a 
s r�uadron of English troops prevented violence . Further 
diffi culty arose at Pallar1c ot tah 111 Nove1Jber an.l later 
at Hallajnhabad , but the bold and courageous act ions ot 
8 
the English con�andant prevented overt insurrection. 
I 
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the English were placed in a pi•eea:rious pos1 tion, tor 
the Sepoys now first b.:Jge.n t o  r ecognize the ir own power 
and s tr ength• 
The situation at Ve llor e and other Engli sh out• 
post s  indic l:,ted ser ious weakness of t he S e poy troop s ,  
namely inclinat ion t o  a c c e p t  the mos t  distor teC. and 
ex1;;ger11 t eci sto17 as fac t . One such rumor claimed that 
the gov :crni"ll.s n"'.; had colle cted e.11 ne\,; ly manu.fac tUl'ed salt 
and divided i t  into t\vo parts one or which wa.s s prinkle4 
·w ith the b lood ot swine an6. the ot hsr of cow1 f'or tb.e 
:purpose of desecration of Mos lems and .Hindus in an ettort 
t o  destroy their cas te . Anot her fallacious story 
maintain&d th e:� the gov (::rn.ment had or dored the erection 
of a Christia:n Chu.r¢h in ev ery v i llage and t he abolit ion 
of idol wor ship. Thus was religious pre judice and 
ti lgo t1·y use i  to inc ite opJ.iOs1t ion to English rule . 
i.lllother out gro-.-: th ,;;f tLe Vello:r e and aas ociatal 
mut ini es • as the disbar .. d;:ian t o!' r1:1g iruents .-ihich .nan1testecl 
sa1· i-:ius confh'Hiuence s .  The Sepoys looked eage.rly forward 
to enli stment i� the Go�pa."lY ' s  s ervie 0  in Iudia . 
rlii lita.r:r service w as cons ider ed a privilege , a desirecl 
posit ion of pre st ige a::ld oppor tun ity for adv aucasum t .  
I t  was a p:i:· imai·y 1uethod of sui.:is i s t e11ce fvl' t he soldier 
and h l s liUl.l"V depe.1deuts . Many gene:t· &.tions ();f one tamil,y 
migh t hav � service in the IU'm,y and thua tha position 
tended to be her edita:ry . Tl.la sapof had the r ight to 
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pension, 44&\i� "'""$ g4'<il..i4t..a.l ,,ai to i'•.J1u3;.rti,, anl ho 
n.lso llnjo1eQ. s.-i11c .:.al clv ll . c 1t.�i.: s .  '.:i:lus �h.21 <:.::::.::1 , from 
lt'w.' tiler pot@n t1al trouble w as Ul.·e.:1 by tho 
a.-vara.noe o.1: t�·ad.i tio,4Ql ties bet,.;c;11i1a natl"11" sow1or1 
al¥i their �lisb 01'1 iC&l'$ • J.'h.l& \.i!aS uuc.;;u;:;;,gu.,. by 
reurga.nizat ton wA ceutrc.l . za »i<;;.n ..J.f P')�•r in q_.� :•;a.glisb 
thou l'lltlill. '.i. ne area� po"1ora '.Ji ·•to :,ii.gl t::sh of filler, 
;'Qr::aer .i.l look.a up to aa a '103;;;ot , iil'&dUt...1.1)· d.3c1··�ase41 
al1li tb"' .>Qa;OJ s b<a&a..'1. t.o v lmJ ti·�i$ 1'Ull�t o.t' hi.;.h.�r 
author1ti w i  t.t� cout�t. 'l'll.J oonsa'4 tc.r�neo ::)f tr:i$ gradual 
a.n4 1U.sJ'e11pilct . 
As the hr1 tisn 1:.<"!lp1.1·., cont ;.a\.lod its i;ro·..:th end 
expansi1)nt thwe aros• a need toi �•·e civil AUil �rllita17 
sena.nts , 11u;uv ct wilicil 'Wftl'e Q.ra1n"'U. tr00i l;illll 1e:rvioe ot 
the c� in Imia.. Tht" new positions wve lllOff 
lucra.t 1ve alA4 presented. &J'8a'\ttl" oppv tnmitJ toi: advane .. at 
w:ibi t1?Ua of'fieors in the ,.�Ulks -w ero d!:d.nisheQ. aD! tho•• 
rou.a1n1::i Wii:n1 of less ab1l '. t;t. Often those who r�1ne4 
in a lett ar 
the 
___ ,,,......, ... ,- �----·----
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One ot the :aoat potentially serious threoJ;s ·· ro5e 
in 122't- among the bigh-cnste Een;:al native Sepoy 
regit'lonts as a. cor.u1equ;ance of the First Euroese War. 
Tho cosmopolitan Ma4ras Sepoy 'Was not affected by be tng 
transpor ted acrc·ss water t·:> tight in :t>urir.a, but the 
Bengal �•?OY oppos.U the mov ement across the "BleekW�ter• 
or nKalapawnoe 11 , even trom Calcut ta to Hangoon, which 
would h�i:.«e been a simple operation . The Bengal Sepor 
onl l ate<.I only for s el"fice in cou.."ltries to which bit could 
narch such as fiindostan or Dekahan, but he m.uch opposed. 
being transported aeroan the eea bee;c'ruse o f  caste 
15 
violet ions. 
fin lnctdent now occurred which threutened IA .Mid 
the loyalty and discipline or tbs bengal native t.ep0y 
t\.rmy . ·rhe Forty-seventh Regiment , which wu atat1one4 
at Duraclq>ore azKl va.s :aaking propa1•ation to march over• 
land to Durma, vas auddenly excited. by rumors that E:ngli sh 
troops had mat disaster in their attack at Ramoo, bad been 
driven into the sea , and that the .Burmese any wat em-oute 
to Bengat.16 It vas turthor rumored thnt tho entire 
Snglisb position in India was nbout to be 4ec1mated . 
Rmor s ot the dUt'1cult1 ot the t arr1.tory to be trnna­
gre nsed end the ha.zal'da ot the proposed march alao crented 
much opposition. The sepoys nov searchecl f'or a pretext 
�-,- - ··--,,,-�_ ........... _..._...... ___ ,,....._.._. . __ _ 
1, 
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to avoid the marcb and rejoiced on l earning ot the 
scarc ity ot available Ca.l"ria.ge-cattle tor t he  movement 
17 
ot troops to Burtaa. However, at tb.ie point a new � 
was ci:roulate4 that baoa11ee ot the inability to rc 11e 
transportation b)" land the s epoys were going to be 
torceably shipped to Burma. Utacontent now (rpenly slll'We4 
itself and the For t7...snentb Reg1aent vowed not tQ orosa 
the sea. Paro.4.ea 1n H'oveml:Mtl" 182'+• tbs Fart;r..Se'¥en.th 
mutined and der.umd.ed extra c omperuu1.tion tor the proposal 
ovnland much . Commandv•in...Chie t ot Engliah. f01"ee 1 ,  
Sil' Deward Paget , no w  marched to �aekpore with two 
ltngliah regiment s  a."ll made an etfort toward explanation 
and eonc1lat1on, but to no avail . Consequentl7 the 
mutinecs were ordered to la,y down their arm1 and mal"'eh, 
and retuatng to do eit he r ,  t he:y were fired upon by the 
F;nglish AJ't111er1.18 Tb• consequeme tor the SeJ)OJ'e waa 
total disaster beeause 1IWl1 were killed in the larlef 
m111ttU:7 action and many met death by court-mal't1al. The 
Fort7-seventh n.cg!.ment vu s truck from tbl aftlJ list. 
Madras troops were shipped into action in Bu.Na and the 
Bengal. sepoys took an overlam route. Thus a cont11et 
which ahou.14 have increased the morale and. enhanced the 
---- -··--<>""-··---·-----�·--..-.. .... ___ _ 
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Holmes , Q.D• Cii•t P• ;3 . 
unity ot the 1:,ngli sh-nntiv e troops tendeu. to h."lve an 
19 oppos ite effect . The situation also reflected how nnive 
an4 gullible the native Sepoy vas . Ue willingly accepte4 
without the s lightest v er11'1cation any tallicous id.ea or 
rumor . The gullibil ttf of the Sep07 played a major role 
1n croe.t tng cU. sc ::•nten<\ and trouble f'or the English. 
Additional 4 1 sc l'Jntant arose as a result ot tbe 
Halt'•Batta Order of 1825' by which the pay at maey ot the 
nat ive ofi.'1cers was unjustly and unreasonably reduced. 
This caused considerable torment and resulte4 in a 
decline of morale and dedicat ion to tbl serv toe of the 
Compaey .20 
Disrespect was added to d istrust and a decl ine 
1 n  disc ipl ine when in 1832 Lord n.ntinck abolished. 
corporal puntshment in the Compa07 • s  l;Zm't .  1'hua was 
another method ot maintaining d1se1pl1ne eliminated ,  a.n4 
the conceeston was 'f lawed by the Sepoys as an 1n41cat1on. 
ot English fear or them rather than devotion to thell' 
vol.tare. The conseque:1ce was to breed contempt tor the 
&ngl1.tl otficers .21 
Another event ot sreat importance in the die• 
integration ot the Sepoy nl"l'll1 was tbe �fghan wu . Tba 
l9Kaye , QR1 c1S• t P•  270. 
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Gepoy tor the first time suddenly realized that the 
6ng11oh army 'Was no inv incible . In the debri.cle of 
Kabul " • • • •  he ( the s.epoy) saw th• proud colour1 of 
the Brttith nation detilecl in the bloody snows ot 
Atghnnisten, and he believed that our reign wu hastening 
t o  a cloee . The charm 1,t a cent1Jr1 t:t conqne1t was then 
22 
broke . "  Though the Sepoys anl:l Engl19h f1nal17 
vindicated English arms in the r e-oonquest ot Atghanietan, 
there yet remained t h.e v1v 1d tf.Ll"nish on Bngl1ah ariu 
that eo1:14 not be removed.. 
A direct nsult ot the Afghanistan war was ta 
a."Ulexation ot Scinde in 1843 . This had considerable 
ett'eet becauee at the ;.epoy army became more thi n]J' 
d i spersed the importance of t he  individual soldier 
diminished . The extension ot territory made th e  English 
more dependent upon ni\'l.tiff tl'OOps and at tha tame time 
th, t dependence became more hazardous • The :f'irs' 
d1 stat istact1on to remote stationing occurred 1n FebrllalT 
ot l8l+lt when the Th:lrt7•F0ttrth Bengal Sepoy Regiment, 
which had been s elected tor occupat ion duty in sctnde, 
refused to c ross tt. border into that teft'1to1"1' unleaa 
considerable gl"eater allouanoe vae Cl'anted . The full 
llllport of this eYen t made Governor -General Ellenborough 
realize the potentially dangerous consequences . Sepoy 
troopa were actually in autiny tor more p,q1 am being 
-···,,., - --·--- �--"'_.,, ___ ,,.._....,  _____ , _  
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nest to tbe restive Punjab border '.llhere disorde:rl.1 
Sikh troops were in dominaticn, a tormidat,le alliance 
was conceivable. The situation was further em:ipU�aw 
b ..  ' the arrival of new L an.gal Raglaenta , the �axty-tf1nth 
and Four th, which became contoinatecl by the tatntell 
Th1rt7 .. Fourth and refused to eroes into Setnde . tt 
was J"'tlmOrod that !1:nglish troops would ntu1e to quell 
the 1.naurreet1on.23 
Thea• nonts spread to Madras an4 incited trouble 
at Jubbulpore vh�re the Engli sh, tailing in their etfol"l 
to use Iiengal troops to occuw thc.t :1c 1r¥l.e, decided to 
use the Madras Sixth Caval.l')". Thouch the Madras troopa 
vere more cosmopolitan than the Bengal troops ,  they took 
the ir families on m111 ta.ry expeditions and. thua a 
heavier burden was place« urion them becau.ae of a401t1ona1 
e:wpense. Thia '*•• e spec1al11 true of the Cavalry becauee 
botns made up mostly ot Mohaaetlans the7 required theb 
spouses • to b• kept 1n seclu11on. 
The allowance to 4etrey expenses ot tbia 
expedition was not as great as expected by the S•J>OY•t 
and. this caused llUOh d iscontent em cnated a. majOI' 
g1·tovance . The st tuat:'. 0:1 voul4 have erupted into 
v1olenc• and mut1nJ in I>ee mber ot 1843 exeept that the 
grant of higher allowances ended the potential danger. 
------------"·--- -----·· 
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Tho Madras goverment now prepared to aend two 
regiments to Bombay by ship and then on to occupy Ge : ruie 
w1tb the pr<>mise that the Forey-..snenth Hegiment woul4 
receivo extra allowance tor the service. However, the 
Madras govern.-aont was acting beyond 1 t s  autho.ri t7 , $!Id 
Lord &llanborcmgh ordered the troops detained at Boobq. 
The a4vv.nt:c ges cf forei gn servtcen being denied thant 
the Forty-Seventh now tndicated symptcims ot rmt1117 which 
were sttpHs sed by tbe Engll sh, an:l thus oou.14 not be uae4 
in th.e occupation of Sc!nde . '!'be Madras umy" . • • • 
broke down at a critical ttmei but only under smcb weight 
or mistlallagoment as !D:lght bfl.ve crushed out the :f'14elit1 
or the best ::iarcenarie a  in the world. "2't 
�ventuall.1 Bombay troops were sent to &rll'X'1aon 
Sc ind.a and the terri t01'7 became a part ot the Bombq 
p1·es 14eney . The two .mutinowt .Bengal regiments were 
oarched !'roi.:i the seene ot the 1r mt1ey a.rd the Th.1rty­
Fourth, because or 1 ts masa misconduct, was disbanded 
at Meerut. If1_ the re.:na1ning mutinous regiments o. tev 
were puntshed and t he  N!!lairu,\er excused for their mis• 
c,:>nduct. 
The resul ta of these ••ente vere tar-reaching. 
The !"(; ther mild att1tu4• of the g0\l'orn.'1lent, in •1ew ot 
the magnitude o:t the a1tuatton , must be a.ccredt te4 to the 
51 
realization that the eolcliers w.:ire actually subjeot0d 
to injustice and in.Juries at the hands ot the gove:rnment, 
and th01:otore to punish them vould be a eeven ata­
Ce.Jl'r1ttge of justice . Howevtu• , too lack of enere 
punisnuGnt created the feeling that the Bnglisb v-. 
aha.id to punish. 
Another consequence �as the sepo7 alal"ll co� 
ing the security ot dwir l'Ja1• The L:ngllsh tailed to 
give a thorough explanation 01' al1 regu.la tions an4 
obligation ot both the government and thct troops concern• 
1ng pay an4 allowances .  Pa::/ 'WU o!'ten granted to 
encourage a Sepoy Itegiment to gc on ac expedition, bu.t 
atter trua conquest 1 t vaa of ten rasc1ncte4. The absence 
ot an exp1Annt1on u 1doubtly incurl'ed mn<:h d ispleasure 
nnd miswllieJ'standing between the government and native 
sepoy troop1 becaus e  lack ot pa;y or reduction of such 
prectp1tated an immediate cri sis tn a soldter • s  tam1 1.1'e 
T he  disbandntent of mutinoas troops also �an1feste4 
serious consequences 1n that � ot the 1nnocant weN 
puni shed as well as the guilt1. There was further de.nae 
in this action because ot tte widespread ef'tect on great 
nw1bers ot �ople and 1n effect placing in en«-ny ha.nu 
large nuabers or wll•trained men. .Disban4zaont9 to be 
effective , net be carried out pro11:1pt l7, bu' in tl:w ease 
ot Sc ind.e thi s was tmpoasible without court ing ser1oua 
danger to thll government. On the contrary to delay ls to 
condone mueh actions and to oncourage turther miaeondttet. 
Fo.rtunately tor the &nglisb P•ace vas a short duration, 
an4 soon there wait another contltct to pacify the l�•POJ 
troops. 
In the winter of 184;.J+6 the , ·• a:roe• a con11piraq 
a.t .01na.por•1 proc laimed. in th• name f.1t the X1ng of l)f;ilh1 1 
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to !.net te  the F1l"at Nati•• Heg1ment to rebellion. such. 
an ent<Jl"prise was well timed Mcau.se the Firs t  � 1hlt Wd 
attraete<l much or the e;O\fern:11ent • s  attention and rosoui·co. 
However; the plot to debauch. the troops �as uncatere4 bJ' 
l!mglish Major nowcrott who rendered further e:ttOl'tl ot 
the conspirators f'l'uitle ss .  
Tho annexation or the Punjab 1n 181+8 brought 
conaequoneea much. more ser J.ous than the oceuptrt.tion ot 
S c inde . The occupying troops , because the tenitor1 waa 
part of tho Pres 14ency or Bengal, had their p iq  reduced . 
Potential rebellion wa.11 4angerous due to the taet that the 
Punjab was IWU'ming with men from the l' eGently d isbanded 
Sikh. l.'ll"lllY .  Sir Charles IJapter , in a tour o r  t he  ve.rtou 
encampment s ,  found gtimersl d1ssatistactton ond reluetance 
to participate in t;he oecu:pa.tioo or the Punjab without 
higher PAY• It seemed that rebelli·)n we.s in a state ot 
suspended ani!llltion a.nd could occur at nny mciri:ent. 
Tho rust 1nci4en ooew.·rtd at wuzeerebad vhoe 
GEmora.l John Hoarser "1 as in eomm.an4t Uowner1 due to 
noarsey• s atrc.iil�: but just ac·tions and tt�• presence ot 
one regiraent of English troops, open rebellion was 
prnent ees. .  A second outbredt occurrod at Crov 1ndghUr 
WhOI'G the Sixty-Sixth lfative Hegiment attempted U:Htuceea­
.tullyt due to the lof3l aid of the Fir st Native Caveb)r, 
to se1ze the tort. The :�1.xty·��txth wr.s 41.sbnnd.911 t� 
its conduc t .  ' 'he Engl 1 ah naw e.lleviated the potentially 
dangerous Punjab s1 tuation b�· granting an 1nereaso tn 
eo::::pensntion for Nntive troops am the impol'tation of 
Qoorkhas from Nepal '"mo poised a t!:l"Gat 1n th.at tbq 
could replace Be..'lgal troopt . The Cnorkhas wer e  not 
ta1nte<'i by oaste i.lnd religicul'J! prejudice and were 
26 superior soldiers . 
The major consequence ,-,f the Scinde anrl Punjab 
1nc14enta was that both resulted it\ concess ions U> t.he 
nattvo troops .  Thia critical quest1nn wat to detcma1ne 
the groatar evil - coneessi on or reststHnee to S•POJ 
demn.'ld.s • 
Tho ru'Ulf!IXation of Oudh also had eonaid.arabl• 
offect an tho Sapo1s in that ::itt.nf of tbt troops WeJ'O drawn 
from that area. PrtOS' to Ou,dh b0Cc'.1r.11ng an r::ngllah 
prov :tnce ,  the Sepoys der1ve4 certain speo1e1 privtleg•• 
trom the COJl� o.nd :respect tro:n the people b&caua• Oudb. 
van a forei n prov ince . However ,  when tbe r::nr,11ab an exed 
the territory and all people came under English protection, 
the Sepoy lost h11 spec ial d is ttncti 'n 1:lfld re spect trom 
t he nntivea .  Thus a privileP,ed c laa s was brought down to 
a c ommon level .  Oudh tu;-ther added t o  the area that the 
Sepoys had to garrison. 
The government o i' Dalhousie t en.led to look upon 
the sero1 insurrections a s  man1£estat ions or governmental 
injus t ic e  and t herefore the troops ve:re not to be condemned. 
at untrust�orthy . Judgement of t he ent1r• army on th• 
basis or recent behavior "1as wtvt ae and unjust because 
who.t they had done for the &ngli sh 1n pa.st times was 
notable and eom.'nendable . i•:ven the recent outbreaks 
ev inced" • • • •  a d.11postt1�,n, 1ndee4 , l' '' ther to injure 
himself than to injure other s ;  aid 1t was not easy tor 
th1:iae wh<> knew him t o  believe that he was capable ot anJ 
violent and 1angu!nary exeessea ."27 His weaker qus l1t 1 ea 
ot character vere thoae least dangerous . The sepoy was 
1uec,:us1stenti he could cletend a c:uropean sold ier Ol" 
officer and t he next moment betray the ea.use ot that same 
of'f icer • Howevel' ,  11 • ., • he vou : d some ti .es brood o'Vel' 
1m.ae1nary wrongs, and when a del�111 on once entered hi1 
soul it c lung to it with the subtle male-volence ot an 
inerad .! cable poison. n28 
The complexion of the Indian army immediate ly 
'' 
preoe�1nt the Sepoy '. 1ebellicin pr•w1dee i"Ul'ther tnsiJJh' 
into that went. 29There was bHsicrilly t u.r ana1es; 
no.mety, tbA Bengal, Bombny, Mad.rs.a and Roya · ( ::ueen• a )  
' •et;bl'3'nts . These t ·UT ern1 es rrovicle t1 DW.rked c atrcst. 
'Thore i,.ie � mu.".'h dtst 1 nett n. � r:r  r-.g tha nat1Te trc>t·ps w1th-
1n tho t•'.'>t.al �1'm)" becri.uiut <.' the et11te l!lY!'.l tem. !'he .Et.tngal 
arm)' 1n ;articular C•:-nt.;.a1ned ra prep�>nd01•11nce · ·t  htgb­
eatite rrte�• 1nclud 1ng .Tats, J':ri jpo ts , and Br.:i;hmtns. 
'!'bus the e.ri st·�cratic tntlu;•nce tn the ?eng,,_l arm,v wat 
V�!rf :>·Nerfu ; .  H vever, the arm1oa '."f Bonb<0.7 · rl4 Madrae 
were web more hoteroften!!)r·,us 1n nature ::lnd tbs lower 
ee.stoa domtnr teJ th..,s• arroian. Cortatnly th& Bengal 
Sl)1d11.tr s11p«r t"1c1 ally apponr494 to be the flnGst,  but he 
vi\!'I .for less l't'l.x"" tea r-ble than ' t s c 'Urlto:rpa.rt tn the two 
other Pr•�1d$0(" t es .  He w �,s much :tore san,,1 t1ve, avue 
of' his supGJ'lnrt t7 , nrrogan t and ftar lc11 d 1 sctp11ne4 
thnn tha Ked:r ':\t1 Etnd oombay :::opoys . tn the Beng&.1 aJ."111 , 
caate took precedent C"tler d1acrtp1 tnf,) t U'll.l this b<llca?llG a 
�".:Instant s nree : t  trouble. 
The n'lm� nnl p?Of»"11"t1 ·'lot , ,f the var1. us c1uitea 11 
typt fted in the '1'11lrty.Pcmrth :le�tmont t",j•t1v• Int'lntr1 
0£ the 'Bongal army wh1eh on d1!llbandmen t conta •.ned theH 
30 
proport ! WI t 
29 
'.JM aripendi:x. 
30Henry Mend, Ill! s1pgz UftqJ.l ( t.ondcn1 John 
; .urrny 18 1 ) ,  P• 23. 
llrn hm1ns • • • • • • • • • •  335 
Chettryas • • • • • • • • • 2 37 
Lower Caste Hindo :;s • • • . 231 
C hristir.ns • • • • • • • • •  1 2  
Nus1ulman1 • • • • • • • • • 200 
s ikhs • • • • • • • • • • .....e.,. __ ].!t_ 
Totul • • • •  1 , 0  · 9  
�'be br dllllins and Chetti·yas , both upper c las s ,  c mp '994 
ab . ut o ixt.v pe;. cent of ttie Thirty ... P'ourth Uag1ment. 
Consider :.ble de L ate arose . .  :var cas te in the Sopoy 
armies .31 some argued that I:ll•ahmins anu Ha .} poots sh' 'Uld 
be onlistod because ot tb·;ir high caste which meant th91 
had � suparic:r qualitie s such a s  bolder spirit, 
p;;:oi.'o ssi ::;;nal pr1ue , high moral s ta.ndard1 ,  and superior 
ph.ysic�l s tructure . :)ppononts srgued that a small 
number o! Lrahmins and �.u.jp o-:ita was bet ter for the s ake 
of d1s·�iplino and. that enl i stments should be made 
indiscr iminately or caste.32 
Arguments also arose o•ar whethor t c>  group troops 
on the bas is of race and nat1on!1 lity or mix th em am 
whether to !dlO'W troops to do local ga.rr i son service or 
be movcK about . In bo th cases the lat ter idea. waa 
practiced . '.rho1·e- was also the quost1•on o:r what' er to 
allow the Sepoys to ke ep their f$111111es -w1 th ther:i or 
s epal'ate thma. The latter system w as used in the Bengal 
--------- -- · --- ..--..-�-·- ----- ,.--- -----
31 
Ho�·11 n ,  \lll• cit. , pp . l3•19 . 
32 ll.'Wl. ,  P•  31+. 
army and the former used in Madras am Bombay because ot 
religious attiliati•::m . A.dd1t1ona1. debate revolved around. 
the question of the qu�ni ty c1 f 1'Sn:".l1!'1h trc.ops to be mixed 
wi th the Sepoy! . Some ar�ued t'."l do so was a.."l 1nd1cnt1on 
of ::l 1.strust . Opponents sa14 that failure to main'ta.in a 
hi ;;h proporti::in was to be over-eo!lt'ident !IDd would l ead  
to disnstar. The ntti tude or the gO\fernment was 
1nd1cnted in the faet that a:f'ter t i  e Ve'.'1.lore MutinJ there 
was a cnll ror ' •:uropean tri,ops , end this was denied b1 
tho :.:angal Oovarnment on the t1 eory that 1t would betray 
trust and eo1 1fid-:rnce tn tho native troo::is . 
In retro�pect 1t appears that there was a much more 
serious qu.est1--m thFJ1 the prop-:>rticn or r::ngU. sh to :Jepo)" 
trno9s in any particular reg1ment 1 namely, the overall 
total s trength o f  t he t�ng ll sh and :1epo7 armies !n India. 
In deter:nining tho 'Vorall ratio it wa� g 3nara.lly accepted 
th:1 t a. ratio ')r one Engli sh soldier to tour n."ltive 
soldiers '.il a s  tho :n � n � unm po � nt rt tolerat1. ">n  imd that more 
than o�a to three was exeess!vo . In 1R56,  �ne year prior 
to the Sepoy 1tebell1'.')n t he  rat1c: was ooe t o  f t v e .  33 
About 'me -third of the 2."lg l i sh troops were raised 
exclusively by tha Comparl7 tor Indian 'Jerv1ce and the 
remainder were Hoyal Regiments used at the discret ion of 
the Imperi.r. l Gcvernmant and paid out of the revenue tor 
India . Beh�een 18 51-56 the number ot Gnglish Cotnpa.nJ 
._,.._ ___ ._ ----
33 
A. D. Inne s, QR• cit,, P• 302, 
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troops was increased, but this was l:lore than oftsot bf 
a decrense in i.lo:ynl B egiments .  In 18 52 there were twent1-
nine Ro:yal Regiments 1n the three Pre s1donc1e s totaling 
about 2,-;:, 000 oen. 34 In 18 53 Engl 1.s h  troops statione d  in 
India numbered• i;.engal 15, 508 , Madras 4, :;oo, and Bombq 
35 5, 532 .  All totaled about 25,000 men, and ab0ut 233 , 000 
native troops as eoz:ipared to 45, 000 !toyal and Compan.r 
�nglish troopa . 36 
The ratio in each "if the three Presidenci es in 
1' 56 was as follows 1 l to 9 and 2/3 ' s,  Madras 1 to 
16 and 2/3 ' s ,  and Bengal, the seat of the sepoy Rebellion, 
1 to 24 :-:.nd 2/3 ' s .37 In 1 8 57  rui tive troc::ps outnumbered 
the English by 7 to 1.  :he native e.1'l!ly contained 310 , 000 
men nf which about one-half were stationed in the Bengal 
Presidency . The Presidency c-::,nta1n&d only t\bout 23, 000 
Bnglish troopa .38 :a:,r Yay or contrast , in 18 � I;;ngl11!h 
troops were appor tioned as :followst Bengal r;3 , 306, 
.....__.....,.. ,....,* ____________ ------- -- -
34Kaye , RP• gitet P• 3�1 
35Grea.t Britain, farllU@QlatX P1Ret•1 Vol .  L, 
( 1860 ': , P •  211, 
36runl ::: . : \o. berts , '��t::i pt '°iiit i.udtt Pnc\11 �gmnany.?f"' the k� · ona x or ri!ver � )' pro111 19?2 J, P• 3 ·-' • 
37
u 1 it , _  '� mes ,  qp. � . , p .  u � .  
38.robn han•iott, ·�bf fgli1h 1n ID&\M\ ( Oxf?rda 
C lo.rondon Brass, 1932 ) ,  p. 6� 
f'act that the number of' officers had declined to about 
one-half ot the minimum ratio . 
This tremendous preponderance of native milit ar7 
strength created temptation ani encouraged the disaffect• 
ed. The situation in Bengal was further magnified by 
the improportionate distribution of English troops through• 
40 out the Presidenc7. The Sepoy Rebellion was mostl.7 
confined to Bengal. 
During these year s  a major drain on the troops 
stat ioned in India was brought about by the Crimean war. 
The Crimean War also effect ed India by t he great number 
of rumors that circulated to the e ffect that the English 
had suffered a major disast er . One rumor stated that 
Russia had conquered and annexea England . The s e  un­
to'¥\ded rnmors were given greater import by the chronic 
\ ' 
belief' that the Russ ians would s omeday wrest mastery of 
lt-1 
. 
. 
India trom the English . Rebellion in India ,  if' it were 
to be successful , would have to occur when the English 
were engaged in a European war . Thus during a critical 
time of public disturbanc e , Eng lish forces in India were 
being decreased . Such act ion proclaimed to the native 
enemie s  ot England the inadequacy of Ens lish resource s  aIJi 
40 
A .  D .  Inne s , ap. c1t . ,  P •  309. 
41 James Wallace, ''The Revolt in India1 Its 
C auses and its r.essonsl" Colli& Pamr.hl.$1t�, Vol. IX 
(February, 1659 ) ,  P •  7. 
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encouragelt resi:itr:nco to Sngland . Bnglish request tor 
nntive reg1nont3 to tir.ht ill tt:e C::im.ean ilar only 
magnified the ouspicion. 
Thus '.·;nglt.nd, while decraan 1ng the size r:>f her 
Indian Empire was dccx·ea.s r ng t ho troops needed t ''  defend 
it, not so much tro� external as fl'nm internal foe s .  Tbe 
�rn;ltsh were deceived in the ccncepti' . .  ·n that submission ot 
nr.ttive stntos n:aant eo�1tentment nnd loy nlty . !!enee t vast 
areas 0t India duri:ig this period lay unpro•� cctad bf 
11nglish soldiers , :;, � st of them being concen + ro.tod in the 
Punjnb because :>f the belief tr:. t any invasion ot India 
mus t cl'.'1::ne rrcm. t hat qunrt '�r . This 111 :�,ply made th e ,�nglisb 
more dependent on the conspirator ial nc.t!ve torces . The 
d nnger of the :ii sp::-op:>rti,:ino.te rati1' between native and 
;t,nglish tro-:>ps Hn s reeogn : zed by .J:::tlhcusie whose re,,ueat 
l�2 tflr three 1•egi�'l ::'lts as rep laceaonts V·'.l.O of nn avail • 
Tho h '  !ltory ·'.'.If the !1epoy army provides abundant 
ma.11ifastnt1. ons of d 1 saffoe t 1 :in and disc<:>nt ont f'r···:!l its 
lneept t:m i n  the 17t.o • s  to the �;eroy J..c;b<3ll1-:in i'.)f 185'7. 
Thez'e weN1 a number of .areas of C' �nt '1:•tL:,n be tween the 
natives an<.! t he : :n3l lsh � hc,t exemplify mi surl.darstandtng 
and d iff iculty . Among these wau tho caste system and 
religious d itforences , r nctnl dtffore�ces , cultural 
ditfarances , enens1on l')f Eng li sh terr1tor1es ,  i'nY and 
prize money, relationships between native soldiers and 
------·- '  ��� _......_. _ _________ ._,_. __ .... - __ .... - . .. .... 
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�nglish of£1cl)l"s , susc0ptibi lity ot nat ive troops to 
rUUlOl' t and the ratio ':lf .. ..:ngl :l.sn to na t ive soldiers . 
These end r;:nny 'ther point-; of trict1::n beca:ne more 
serious as t ime pnssed, and gradU3.lly the Sepoy OZm'i 
bGerune more suspicious o.nd fe:u-::::u1 of 'm;;l1 sh 1'1tent ions ,  
Gradually the ::;e po�"S begai1 to realize their ' wn 
s1gn1f1ca.nce :l1ld recognized the great rel iance that the 
'Lngli sh placed upon them. I t  w o. '  t oo  Bep".>fS up::m whom 
the l:!;ngli sh relied t o  kliHp the 20.'J, -, �, , , r;o,, lndiM'.11 in a 
p eaceful stti.te ()f ai'taii.·s.  'Thu�; the :::epoys qero the 
tr..ilwar�� 0f Lnglish power in Ind �a, but a.s d i scoc1tent and 
di '.: 9nt1 sfaction s pread tho Sepoys becac• more a liabi litJ 
than an ass et .  In i' act th@ �'iepoy e:r·:ny poi sed a sariou 
t�u-ea.t to English power in India• 
t.ny r evolt against the �:ng lish in India had to 
rece Iva t he suppor t  o! the natlve army and so the anti• 
Enr,li sh teel1;::g 'W :1 :1 an important factor . The cu l::iination 
of this ei·a o f  mi sunderutandin rr, and �rten 1r:'.tag1 ne4 i�·15lish 
1nju'.i t tce wi tnesseJ open m111t :::,ry rebel1 I on e.nd 1 t was 
the J epoy troops , ':he unwitt hig pmms of hoham:1edan 
poll ticnus , that �Jrovidod t1. o neee:isin.• mili tnry !!Upport.  
�i1thout such support any c<Jnsp11•acy to revolt · mu l.d have 
been n j oke . 
CHAPTER III 
SOC IAL AND ECONOMIC REFOill 
A considerable amount or the latent host ility 
and discontent with English suzerainty in India had 
its inception in the many soc ial and e c onomic r eforms 
t hat the English instituted during the fir st half ot 
the nineteenth century . Such r eforms were extremely 
difficult to effect because tradition was paramount 
and many of the cus toms wer e  steeped in antiquity . 
C hanges and new innovations were fur '"her c omplicated by 
the fact that within the c onfines of India were t o  b e  
found " the adher ent s  of nine great religions , so:. e ot 
which are in their turn split up into almo st innumerable 
sects , rangi g from an austere monotheism to a bewi lder• 
1 ing polythei sm. " 
Precipitant and rapid social and e conomic c hange 
created a distrus t  of the English and placed in suspicion 
their real motives for such change s .  This susp icion, 
added to those of English expansion and mi litary r eforms , 
only magnified the native doubts of English intentions , 
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The concentration on social and economic reforms 
in India did not manifes t  itself until about the second 
decade of the nineteenth century during the regime ot 
Lord Bentinck ( 1828•35) to whose administration the 
origin of mos t Engli sh r eforms in India must be credited . 
2 
The institution cl' thuggee had existed in India 
from time immemor ial and was quite prevalent during the 
nine teenth c entury. Thuggee was an organized system ot 
murder and robbery directed by profes sional s who 
accomplished their tasks systematically and artistically. 
The thugs , whose emblem ot trade was the pick-axe and 
noose,  were a hereditary association or murderers adhere­
ing to a particular cas te .  This association had its own 
goddess,  ritual, observance s , mythical or igin and 
sacrificial rite s .  The thugs worked in small groups alli 
when not engaged in their traditional occupation were 
innocent farmers or villager s .  Though frequently known 
to the ir fellow villagers they were s eldom revealed because 
or the supersti tion of divine protection . Furthermore the 
crime was often beneficial enough to individuals , other 
than those who committed the crime , that it enjoyed 
c onsiderable popular protection.3 
The systematic suppression of this abomination to 
2 
From which the modern t erm thug is  derived . 
3John w. Kaye ,  �.A.dm�ni��.l'Jl.�iol} _�t.  J:h!..��as t  India 
Q.�mJl.� ( London: Richard Bentley , 18 53), p .  367 . 
society was not finally decided upon until about 1829 , 
when t he pro j ect was entrusted to Major Sleeman. During 
the next six years over 2 , 000 thugs were ar1•ested of 
4 
whom 1, 500 were put to death or transported ror life . 
Lord Bentinck ' s  v igorous pros ecut ion of this crime soon 
manifested its effect s , am within t en years thuggee was 
large ly elimin.:-.ted . Thi s  :uarked Eng lish success was due 
to t he suspension of some of the traditional c ourt 
proc edurers such us giving every benefit t o  the accused 
and evadiag trinl on some technical point . 
The surpre ssion of t he related crime of dacoity 
proved more difficult . Dal{Oi t i  was sir1ila.r to thuggee 
in that it had a hereditary caste and religious rites . 
Dakoits \·1en-t: in bands of thirty or forty , thei r favorite 
weapons being the lance ar.d fire-bran:l . Less scientific 
about their occupation, than t he  thuggee ; murder was 
merely incidental to the main purpose or robbery . This 
fraternity contained a �reat number of respactable 
members of society aal becaus e ot their contribution to 
villages and landholders , it was difficult t o  bring t hem 
t o  justice because of perjury en masse. 
The English had early recognized t he problem of 
dacoity but it was not unti l 1837 that the first effort 
at suppress ion was made with Colonel Sleeman again playing 
I+ Oswell, op. cit . ,  Vol . III , P •  ll+l. 
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the prominent role . Though dacoity was not totall.1 
suppressed even in the days of Iord Dalhousi e ,  it had 
by the 18 50 ' s  greatly decreas ed .
5 
The slow eradication o r  
dacoity was due in large measure to the failure of the 
English to apply similar restrictions on judicial 
procedurers a s  had been applied agains t the thugs . 
Another civilizing measure instituted by the 
6 
English was the abolition of sat 1 .  The practice or s at1 
was more prevalent in Hindostan but it was common through• 
out most of India, especially emong the Hindus , and cm 
be traced far back in Hindu his tory; however it had no 
foundation in t he  books of Hindu antiquity. When the 
husi  and died , it was a practice for the spous e to publicly 
burn herself as a symbol or her devotion and faithfulness 
to her husband . Many women dedicated themselve s to the 
flames wi th an enthusiasm characteristic or t he martyrs 
of the early Christian era . Sat! was a popular1l.y re spect­
ed institut ion of divine self-sacrifice ,  but what made the 
crime such an abhorrence was than of ten the wife was un­
willing to sacrifice herself . As practiced amon g the 
Mohammedans , the reluctant w ife could not be compelled to 
meet this fate but such was not the case wi th the Hindus . 
I t  was quite difficult to determ ne those cases in which 
---------------- - ________ , _ _ _ 
5Kayei I.tit ,Mmiqistr?tion of' the �ast India 
Company, p .  4 1.  
6 The word '.:1eans dedicated . 
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the widow was willing or loath to sacrifice her life , 
and thus the relatives of t he deceased husband often took 
advantage of the circums tances for proprietary and 
financial enhancement and urged the wit'e to burn herse lf'. 
Often the widow selected death by flames rather than 
suffer alternative s consequences , and so tor practical 
purpose s  s he was actually being murdered by her relatives . 
Consequently sati was of such a nature that only comple te 
prohibition was a jus t solution.7 
The inception of an etfort to suppress sati began 
in 1802 when Lord Wellesley instituted an enquiry into 
the prevalence ot sati . Investigation revealed that 
between Apri l 15 and October 1,,  !Solt ,  no le ss than 116 
widows had been burned alive within thirty miles of 
8 Calcutta. In 1819 there were 6'0 cases in Bengal alone 
:) 
which was a considerable increase over the 181' statistic s �  
Despite t he  widespread observation of this practice most 
of the governor-generals of India refused to take decisive 
action except t o  warn aga1ns t the practice. Lord Amherst, 
7 
A. D .  Inne s ,  op. cit . , P• 210. 
8 w .  Lee-Warner , ''India and Afghanistan ( 1815• 
:9 > " , Cam�dgf Modern Hi�fX (Cambridges University f·ress , 193 , ol XI , P •  • 
9Kaye 1 4bie Admin1s�rAt1on �f....!,pe East India ComPAAYt P • 5jl . 
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admonished by the Court or directors on t he sub j ect , 
refused t o t ake action on the expedient t heory that more 
active interference would excit e the �inds of the natives 
so great ly as to render t he  ri sks to s erious . Lord 
Bentinck also recognized t he problem in a lett er ot 
November 8 ,  1829 when he s t atedt 
Whether the que st ion be to cont inue or to dis­
continue the practice of s at1l t he decision is 
equally surrounded by an awfu responsibility. 
To consent to t he consignnent year after year 
of hundreds of innocent victims to a cruel and 
untimely end when the power exist s of preventing 
it i s  a predicament whic h no conscience c an 
contemplate without horror . But , on t he other 
hand , if heretofore received opinions are t o  b e  
considered of a ny  v alue , to put t o  hazard b7 a 
contrary cour s e  the v ery safety of t he Briti sh 
Zmpire in India, and to exttnqui sh at once all 
hopes of thos e great improvements affecting the 
condition , not of hundred s and t housnnds 1 but ot millions ,  which can only be expect ed rrom 
the co11tinuance of our supremacy , i s  an 
alternative whic h even in t he  light o f  humanity 1(, it s elf may be considered as a still greater evil. · ·  
Ultimately it was Lord Bentinck who couragevusly 
promulg3.t ed a law in 1829 prohibiting sati in any form. 
On t hat oc cas io n  Bent inck remarked that all clas ses would 
"be s ecure in t he ob servance of their religious usages ,  
so long as that syster.1 c an be adhered t o  :�ithout violation 
of the paramount dictates ot justice and human1ty. n11 
By 1847 the pract ice of sat i had largely dissipat ed .  
11 
Lee-i:fal'ner , loc . c1,t, 
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Another reform instituted by the Englis h  was the 
abolition of infanticide . This practice , which lacked 
foundation in the sacred books or the II1ndus ,  was 
pract iced mostly by the Rajpoots and was peculiar to the 
higher order or c as tes of peopl e .  Infancticide especiall.7 
prevailed in central and western India. The motive tor 
this practice was religious in nature and attached to 
the stigma and dis grace incurred by an unmarried Hindu 
woman .  I t  w as better that a rem.ale infant should die 
than reach maturity unwed . 
The chance s  of marriage were limited by the 
necessity ot finding a sui table mate in the proper caste 
and prtry,1ding the prohibitively expansive dowry . It 
was a cbnsiderable advantage not to have daughters and 
thus av oid the high expense and difficulty or marrying 
them. The pr ac t ice or inf'anticide was s o  s trong that 1n 
certain tribes the male s outnumbered female s  about six t o  
12 one . 
The English recognized this detestable pox to 
socie ty �uite earl.7 but encountered considerable difficulty 
in eliminating i t  b ecause or the difficulty ot proving 
the actual cause or an inf'ant • s  death. Thus in the earJ.7 
period ot English ascendancy the practic e  was common and 
quite unabated despite English admonitions to the contrary 
and native r eassurances that the practice would c ease. 
----- ·-· .....  ----·-�-- --- -- ···-·--------
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The Engli sh s ought t o  get at the s our c e  of the 
evil by eliminating the c aus e .  La1-1n 11ere pas sed limit• 
ing the expenditures on marriages and douri as . Though 
t hi s  evi l did not totally disappe2r ,  it was gre2t ly 
reduced and s oon t he natUl'al proporti on of t he s exes 
be':'.an to resume a mor e normal state. 
Bent inck also placed restrict ions on t he s lave 
trade by a regulation pro::mlgcited in 1832 uhich made 
i llegal the removal of slove s  for traffic from one 
Bnglis h  di strict to another. 13 
Other than t he abolition of evil cus t oms am 
pract ices , Lord Bentinck ' s  admini stration is nost 
as sociated. with the emphasis placed on educat ion in 
India. An i!1tere st in education wa3 manifested as 
early as the Chart a1· Act of lC'. 13 which stat es that a 
• • • • • a sum of not less than one lac of 
rupeeo in oaeh yeoz shall be  s et apart an:l 
applied t o  the revival am i1aprovement of 
lit erature ,  and the encouragement ot the 
learned Nat ive s ot India ,  and for t he intro .. 
duction and promoti on of a knm1ledge o:t the 
sci enc es among t he 1nhabitanti4or �he British t errit orie s in India • • • • •  
Tho :first serious interest appea red in 1823 during the 
Bent inck t enure.  Educut ion up to Bentinck ' s  ti me had 
been primarily oriental in nature and the language in use 
either sanskirt or Arabie . Bentinck recognized the 
13 
Leo-Warner , � cit , 
14Huir , O"Q• cit . ,  p .  296 . 
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ineffectiv enes s  of this and advocsted t he  use of 
1 5  
English in association with the various vernacular.$ . 
The stre s s  on education was given further impetus 
by the Charter Act of 1833 , which opened the Company ' s  
s ervice to native and Englishman alike - - res trictions 
as to color and creed no longer wi thstanding. Section 
ei ghty-seven of that act declared that "no native ot 
the said territorie s ,  nor any natural-born subject of 
Hi s >faje sty resid ent there! , , shall , by reason only or 
bis religion, place of birth, descent , colour , ar any 
of them be disabled from holding any place, office or 
16 employment under the Company . "  The purpose of this act 
was importan� in t he impetus "such recognition w as 
calculated to give to t he  progress of native educat1. on. • 17 
The progressive enlight enment of t he  Bentinck 
regime greatly enhanced the growth of educational 
institutions in India . Many new universities opened. 
including the Medical College of Cnlcutta,  1837 J  the 
School of Industry of Jubbulpor e ,  1837;  the Engineering 
18 College of Roorkhee ,  1848 ; and n1a.ny others . Thus 
__ , __ ___ _ 
1'Persia.n was abolished a.s the language of the 
courts in 1837 . 
16courtenay P. Ilbert Ill!._G2:,'lernm1n:t, ol In.di& 
( O:xf'ords C larendon P !'e s s ,  192� ) ,  p .  1f9 . 
17Kaye1 l'.hf!_A@ln1str�;t:!,on Q .. t....t..lN. �ast Irui1& 
�rul.'La. p .  1+2].. 
18 
Ilbert ,  on. cit., P• 87.  
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Bentinck estc,bli sl:ed t he ::ounuat ion or an educational 
syst em in Indi;:i. �,nd promulgat ed numerous social reforms . 
Superficially , nt least , it seanied that he left India in 
" a  condition of px·oi'ound repose - - a repos e  which so 
far as alien observ ers cccn int erpret Indian sentiment , 
a.pp·'J : red to be the fruit of social contentment . 11 19 
However , the app9ara.nce was deceptive and superficial 
as a fre s h  coat of varnish ! 
The English also introduced into India a vast 
transportation n.nd com:zmnic;ctions network , but progress 
in thi s area of public works was much slower thail in the 
areas of r:ioral and social refor1:is alll did not reach 1 t s  
apogee until t ha Dalhou::;ie admi�1istration. 
The inception of public works began in India 
dnrine the 132 0 '  s r.:nd 1 ::� 30 ' s with t he building of a 
system of canals which grew out of the need for irrigation . 
I n  the early 1320 '  s the \fest ern Jumna Canal �·1as built 
followed in the 1830 ' s  by the Eas t ern JU1llna Canal.  A 
great famine in 1838 gave further impetus t o  canal• 
makiug . In 18 53 construction \'IU$ begun on a Ganges canal 
which was described in its day a s  "the mos t magnificant 
work ever undertaken in India - - one of th.a most 
20 
magnificn.nt works in the world . "  The building of the 
19
Marr1ott ,  op. cit . ,  p .  137 , 
20 Kaye , Th§ Ad!n1n1§.t.L1.U.Q.n of tb.si ;;iast InsU& 
CQmpaAy, p .  29 1 ,  
Gi·eat ':i.'1·unk •{oad , which c onnoc � ed Calcutta and Delhi 
and t hen on t o  Lahor e and Peshawar , �..ud a t otal length 
of 1 ,  1;23 mi le s ,  and greP.tly facilit �\ted t he pr oblem or 
transportation. P:cior t o  l'.'"52 t h e  entire L:.i le::.1c;e of 
rai l· ;ay s in India i.Ja s  1.:mly t'.JO-hunJred mi i e s . In 1352,  
D'• lhousie took t t1e init iat iv e o i:· urgi ; tho ext ension 
of t his embryo network . The fir :1t o stal s erv ic e  uc,9 
inst1 tuted -.iur in.g t ho J.::lhous ie t enur e and the half-penny 
poi:i t  Has crented for all of India t hu!l gro.'.'.tly enhancing 
21 
and im;.ions ely facilitating communic�'.tio·1  r:nd cor•un.·01rce. 
T ho first t ele[;raph also c :-u·ie i nto uso uni �le ::rly four 
t hous and mi les of elect ric telecraph w ·i s  laiu . Dalhousie 
also t ook. an Lit erest in suc h :ru.bli c works as iraproved 
harbor s ,  br id �c s ,  c:inals and roc.ds .  He refor·Jed the 
pri son sy stci;:1  and in 1()54 int rociuc ed t he :ne s s  hall 
cafet eria syst Ek '·Jhich c s.us ed .:iany pri son0 r s  t o  f'eo.r loss 
o f  caste and consequent 2 .y  t he .�ng !_i sh wer e accused of 
delibe1·at ely att empt ing t o  c ;:i.us e the pr 1 scner s to los e 
ca�;t o .  Dalhous i e  al!:lo brou;::ht public ed11cnti o:-, under 
c ontrol of t he s tate , and for t he fir st time tha educ ati on 
of Hindu and Mohammedan f emales was int cod.uc ed . 
One wri t er SU.'lL'Tiarizes the progr e s s  and consequences 
-------- --------·---· ---------
21 Ironically if t l:ase event s 1·1hic h  aided in 
procipit :,_t in ' � l:o '> e:1oy E;ebollion of 1857 h.'.ld been 1nst1• 
tuteu o. doc :i.de Oi' t �;o :'r'iox· to t hc_t .�v ent then the 
rebellion c·•:inld ;1 ev er hr1.v e rea_ched such gr e tct '.'lagnitude . 
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of the Dalhousi e  education reforms thus 1  
A vast network of educational institutions ha s ,  
under the system thus initiated , been spread 
over India . These institutions s tart from the 
indigenous hedgeschools of the Hindus and the 
old Mosque schools of the Musalmans which have 
now been brought within G overnment Inspection . 
They advance ,  by well-ordered upward steps , 
to  the V ernacular and Anglo-vernacular schools , 
the High Schools ,  the af"f111ated Colleges end 
the Universities .  The whole forms a complete 
gradation of Public instruc tions under the 
direction and control or the s tat e • • • • • 
It has s et in motion new force s intellectual 
and political, whose magnitude lt i s  impossible 
to gage , but which the British Government now 
finds itself compelled to reckon with . Amid 
all the checks w hich occurred to Dalhousie ' s  
consolidating system in India,  after his firm 
hand was withdrawn, this tremendous factor of 
unification has gone on working without break 
or intermission ,  gaining strength, and di sp laying 
its m:" rvellous :results on an ever-extending 
scale . Even the Mutiny did no t int errupt the 
progress or Indian education. The ye ar 1857 ,  
which saw us forced t o  tight for our exi stence, 
also saw the Acts passed to establish the three 
Indian Univer sitie s , since increased to fiv e ,  
which form the Copes tone of Publi c Ins truction 
in India. Every Viceroy , what ev er his pub lic 
policy or private idiosyncras ies ,  has s ought 
to connect his name with the magnificent system 
or Indian State ed�cation introduced during Lord 
Dalhousie ' s  rule . 22 
The program or Dalhousie in its entirety has been de scribed 
as "one of the most comprehensive and tar s ee ing which ever 
issued from a human brain . •23 
A major source of Anglo-Indian triction other than 
the social and economic reforms alluded to was that ot an 
----- · --- ··----- - --- ·-------
2�arriott , 2»..L.-9..lli, PP • �-57 • 
23ll?J,Ji. , P• 1$$. 
e quit able sys tem of taxation. The Engli sh ,  1n ei"f'ecting 
a permanent s e tt lement ?f thi s problem in Bengal,  Hadras ,  
t he Dekhan and other parts .-; f  India arosed considerable 
ho s t i lity and oppos i t i :�n among an influential group ot 
the Indian c i t izenry . 
The primary sources of Eng li sh r evenue i n  Inc�Sa. 
wer e  the taxes on l a nd ,  salt , opium and c ustoms , It 
was t he former which mos t immediat el y effe c ted the bulk 
of the neov1 le and also that which yielded t he largest 
revenue . Though there were numerou s  other taxe s ,  all 
of which f'luctur.ited in the rev enue yie lded , t he 18 52 
rev enue on t he se fonr primary t axe s indicates t heir 
24 relative impor t anc e .  
Land -----------------$14 , 2 50 ' 000 
Opium - - - -- - -- -· - - - - -- - 2 ,  500 , 000 
Customs -- - - - - ·- - - - - - - - 2 ,  000 , 000 
S alt - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - l , 22 '.) , 000 
When the Hogul J�:npire uas in the acendency in 
India, the 11fa.rm1�1g out 11 me thod of ta.:x co lle c ti on was 
used . The p1·ocedur e w a s  to div ide t he land i nt o  districts , 
de termine t he amount oi' til lable land in each district 
and t ha anticipa ted producti o n .  Ue termina t ion of the 
yi e ld prov ided the bas i s  of' w hat was t o  be pa id to the 
2 5  goverruaent . 1'he government then appointed a tax 
----------- --- ··---· - · - - --- -··-·---
2>+Ka.yg ,  The Adrainis tr:'.ctiQIJ. ,Jf t he :fas t India 
c 01µ..Qgl).Y' p • 11+8 • 
2 J'I t is intor e s t :In g ,  in v i ew of the event s ot 
t ho tw:mt1 eth century , t o  ob serve the i nnumer able 
contradictions inherent in the political and economic 
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c o l l e c t or of t h o  J i s t r i c t  11ho ·,r s r e spons :t b l c?  for 
c o llec t i ng i; \ o a �10unt due t !: e  3ov ermnent le s s  that of hi s 
' 26 own a llm'anc e .  Fr eq i_: ent ly D.i li t ·1ry offi c er s  -.·1 er e gi v en 
d i s t r i c t s e. s "' rc:wr;.�·J f '.) �· t h 2ir s erv i c e s , t h:-:.t '. 1ere exempt 
fro :r; 
':' tc ;::ov ·J.::·n. . :mt 1.rnlJ c ont r o l  ov er such d i s t r i c t s  
i :1cliv id1: ::: l s ; t r · '-'Y c .  :_; L\ b e  fro .. 1 -· v i l l.:;. ; e  c o ·.� unity or 
---- --- -R- ----
0 ct i ' O l 2  : i c' · =' - t ' : ' c · ·1:U: ·-· ·1 ' �t , ,  co ·y ·uni c: t  · -r i t or s  in t he 
·:lic.i-nir:et e o nt h  c ent ury c, ,; :.pro p o s  to I nd :i. a .  
Kar '. '. '.arx , in a s er i n s  of le t t er s ent i t led � 
fi r s t  L1(Li u:._ i_e_r c:�LJ�nclg.:_;..:'?_! 'd '.":."2.9_0-l- J . .. :���:;2o ( ; ;c, '' c crw t  
Por e i c:n T,e. n ·nr ::· o s  I'".11 l_i --t::i. :U', Fou s e , 1 9:)0 ) , e n  · t i[·; c t e s  th e 
i�n ::;li sll un· 1o r c j_ fn 1 -· y  :.':o:· t !  CJ r :oli t i c n l  and econoFiic 
cx::i lo i t A t i on o f  I ndi a .  '. lnrx ac cu s e s  t h o  :·;n,� l i :; h  of pre­
s oi---v i -�� ::-.; ;-1T1.L� stro:�g�. iLc ;1�.J1�3 +: h_n _: .. '. 1_; d �.l � �r � t e : i n  Ind i a  and 
n s :i. n;:". t h  c 1:1n�: ·; o c i a l  and ccono: ::ic ref'or;Hs for t he 
u l t o J." i (}l.. �·ltl"' p o ·; o  c, _f fr1rt h r?r or1 �:; l,'J.\J i ri.r; 03"2U :) 1.1.l= j t1 g 2.t i ng  
and n·11 rj t t i  c r,o;.;ulac e .  
: t  :l s 7•,_:_ :�tr1 0 :·_., �nai·,·1t ai;-10,j t h: t �;l :e �rt ::; li :Jh i:i.1V e st­
:u.e nt in Ind i a  " s not .,:ctua.l l y  o. nay inp, propo �J i  ti cn in 
t corus of r: o :> t  7 H ' :'3 U S  _i_ ·w o -:; t 1 mt t l 1.11" • b o in. r• bout 10 , 000 
Sng li s h ';aras i t e s  holding luc r ·  t iv e  po s i ·d nns i u  Inuia 
·.1ho '.1C t u<> ·1 1y .. 1 c c r1:.od t h8 p.'..' ::>fit s .  · 
Marx r e 1 e ct s t he � n g li sh s y s t a11 of t axat ion as 
u�ic; c rll ' lo , ., i :  : ; h  · t  : ;h-3 r ev a:nrn d er iv Jd '·1 · s  nev e r  re­
t urned t o  t he r eople in t h9 form o f  publi c works .  
''ar"· � o ··"- nn·· �  c • 1 · t "" 1· ,� ··· e -"OY '1 "'J n l+ "'""° 1R r:'7 59 � i  .. \. \.,.,; .  l.;. U ':.. � ..;. ::_-. 'J-i .,. l • "-'--' · __ J ""j !.. > '·- -� '-' V.J. -- ,,)  -
was in  r eality a popu l ar upri s i ng incit ed by t ha 
sn pr .:l3 s ed p oo)l •'c , not a s  .no s t  .;n :, li -;h wri t ar s  cont e nd ,  
t h e  d i s c ont e nt of t h e  :nili t ary . I t  i s  fur t h i H' co nt ended 
' h - t  tho ·3xplo i t sd '1la s s e s  part i c i p a t ed i n  t h e  r evo lut i on 
en :�as s e ,  d i r 2 ct 1 y  or irnl i r e c t  Ly and t h:: t t h e  revolt 
f:Ji l d only oec ·,;.ti.s e  nf t '1 e  etL:3 ; ;i c ,  religL:m s , polit ical 
and geoera:-ihi c u i v e r": i t; y  .if Ind i a .  
') _,... 
'- 0'1'.- e t s, �:-c o l l c:c t o r . ; a s  c alled a z er:iindar a 
t er:·1 oft en synonymous ui t h  a wealthy or gr o at land-owner . 
27 suc h n d i s t r i c t  w a '.':  c ulled a �i aghirdar .  
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Often the office of zemindar w as coni'erl'ed on some local 
chieftian who he ld prop1·ietd.7 r ight dating f1·om remote 
antiqui t J .  However , the zamLidnr helJ no such proprietary 
:· ight and though he might :Jre sume that the position would 
be pas s ed on to h is hair s ,  the of :.'ice was neverthe le ss 
ti lled a. t t he will of t ha ·::aramo\Ult power • The actua.1 
governmentnl t a.x ass e s snent was liable to arbi trary change 
based on poli tic c l  expeJi �ncy a s  r:o c e s s ::.ry t o  enhance 
28 
t he finr.nc i 2.l 1·J elfar '.·, of t he g�·w<irn.'Tle nt . 
'i'he taxat i on syc: t e  l �1as aot sub ject to legis lative 
one.c t:ient but only t o  t rad.i ti  on :oi.nd local u s age . Though 
t hi s  sy s t e:·� v . .  ried throu:�huut India end in soi::ie areas 
w.:; s non - exi s tant , t ho exx1ple al1 ud ed t o  provide a basic 
::mt l l.ne of i t s  3Gne1' 0.l ope r ::ct 1 , . In rer�lity the land• 
holding s;s t ec:: ;:;.f India ' <: s  f:-:.r :a.er e c haot i c  than the 
fcuC:'.al sys ten of the : ;- i.dd le ;; 13e s . 'This traditional Mogul 
me thod of t ax'.' t :1  • 1 n , a system inher i ted by the Eng li sh 
in the e i ghteenth century ' 'a s  2.. �-;ub j e c t  th -- t  oft en 
ab sorbed an unpropor tio:1c.I share 0f <.l governor-ge nera.1 1 s  
attent :!.on . 
The fir s t  g·:ivcrn or -ge neral to bo p lagued by this 
prob:.3r.1 was C ornv1alJ. l s , who in t ryil:; t o  c ::: e £;te 2. more 
orr;ani zed <.:ml 1:>:1ii'o:rm sy s t e:i ·'.'Ut of ·:cas s c ho.o s ccac eived 
of the fallic "!.'.)US ide:>. that the grant Land lora fa:1111es 
-------- ----- -------�--··· .. - _. __ , .. ·--- -
28 
Mills , _QP ._cit . •  , v .., 1 .  V, P• 338 .  
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of England w ere analogous to t he Indian zemindars .  In 
England the progress of t he rural community had depended 
large ly on t he landlord c lass who h eld great s ecurity; 
and so Cornwalli s argued that if the zemir:odar were g iven 
s imilar securi ty he would be a sou:c e a  of benafi t and 
progre s s in India . The soil �muld be v e st ed i :t a small 
group of gre at landowner s ,  as i:i "2:agla::d , and cultivation 
c onduct ed by t ho  many te c1ant s .  The zemindar could be 
induced to look after tho general w elfare becau se this 
•:1ould re sult ult inate ly i ·  the .i ' .cr eased ' ·alu e of his 
property aid he would bo u r .a  c los ely t i. ad to the central 
covern.;ient to which he i iould owe hi s s ecurity . 29 
'.!.'he key t o  the succe s sful operati on of th i :l theory 
depended on e s t abl:t shing the sacuri ty of t he po sition and. 
t enure of tho zeni ·tdnr D.l'"l.d in a gua1•a.11t e e  t hat the gov ern-
r.cent would not ct n Y:i'J future elate i::tcre c.se ! :: is t a.Jtes and 
thereby des troy his g :i ·  '"' . This ':1 as the b a s i s  of the 
Permanent Sett lement '>f •)ongal , 1793, which e s tabli shed a 
fixed t ax  guarant eed i n  prape tuity , at tho rate then in 
e ffect , and made t ho zemindo.rs hered � t ary p:"oprietors of 
the soil upon 212ymont o"!: t he land-tux. 3o 
Tha results of the C ornwal1-is Sett lement did no t 
manife s t  t he de sire d result s and proved s eriously defectiv e .  
T.he zemind.ars did not fulfi ll the expectati or1 o f  introdue t-
291Pll• ,  P •  339 •  
30Me ad , QP.., c it , , P •  311. 
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1ng agricultural inprovoment s ,  and a s  a consequ:.mce no 
one profi t ed from the Permanent Set t le'1rnnt except t he 
z.amimlars who \vero now f'ort i 'i ed in t h 3tr positions by 
zemind:o.r r.:::i.ine: t a f?_ir rent , fi;:Gd : o:;�_r:.· :.: ) ·- n.d  freedom 
of t rans fer -. :it hout any s ac 1· i fiCi3 '  " Tld the :nly basis 
upon wbich he could be o jectod w.<,;,:o f:,1 i lur e  t o  pay the rent . 
The inuedit::.t o  c o :1se u : ;1c ci of t he i engal 8ettle 1ent was to 
s i tuat ion in · crit i c a l  'm:c �.J :3 i s  a s  follow s s  
I3ut · · '.l'. c·c 1 ' D. s  t bi ):;:' i c e  ,y;: t ho Pernanunt 
S 3t t l enent in Bcm10al'i' »le not onJ.y r e li nrui shed 
the 1'i i;ht of t h e  Gov e::· uncnt t o  o.ny ftU' t her 
rev enue f:.•ou land , whi c h  w a s  undoubt e d ly a 
gr oat sacr:'. i' ic e ,  bu t ·,;:·: at '.m s  :mch •,101· s e , wo 
d o ;,t royed <:ell the exi s t 1 ng property i n  1 nnd , by 
crcilt i ; n c las s of propr i et , T s  t o  1 .·bor.: ':JO 
r-e1� J. s s ly ;.;.de ov er t h e  oro p erty o:f ot hers • 
• • • • he (Cor;-;,w llis ) wnc: -+: be e r r� <  t or of 
pri· .. ate )l'o; erty in t he St..-: t e  rev enue ani the 
grE:Jat d e :, b :cyer of t he priv r t e  r1roper·�y in land 
in I ndia.; d e s t:coyin g  hundl ed s  or t h::>us ands ot 
p�o��!e t�� s for c7 ory one t hat he �r�tuit ous ly 
c r o  . .  ., '-'d •  
T he a > ui s i t i c' n  of t erri t ory in ::;outhern India as 
a r e s ult of tha li; n ore ,fa:c s  na c e s :Jit : t ad  o; o::io s ett lement 
there . �' hough �;out h orn India had a :1ys t e. : s jJii lar to 
t hat o::.· Beng a l ,  it diff r ed apnreci.·1bly in th t it was 
not tho t i•o.d:l. t i  :· .�ll sy s t en am t f>.;:J t 1-. he zemir:dar1 was 
not an est 0i.bJisl1ed. inst itut ::. m .  The s ett le:,1ent in 
S ort l':wrn L .d i:-, as c ::.rr ; eJ out by 'Hr Thomas i".onro , 
31t.1uir , cp, cit . ,  PP • 19 1-92 
79 
guided by the princi ple of adaptation or the exi st ing 
system in Benga l ,qnd hnving li ke !'lot ::i_v e .  Monro, unlike 
Cornwallis , ·was not guided by western theories nnd 
analogies in t he la."ld satt le�Jant , a nd so he proposed a. 
s ett lement based on prevalent custo:: 1s that were understood .  
The Dekhan settlement ,  sir:iilar to the Madras S ettlement 
or 1802 , provided that the ryot32was to hold the land 
d irec t ly fro t he  gov errunent which recognized the ryot ' s  
propriet ary ri ght t o  the soil wi thou.t the intermediary 
landlord c lass . The governr:ent ' s rent was fixed for a 
t ern of years rather t han i n  perpetuity and the ryot was 
giv en freedom or transfer a.11d fixity of tenur e .  33 
Howev er ,  a source of friction soon arose because, 
unlike the zemindar sy ste:: , ,  any change in lnnd addition 
or subtract ion r esulted 1n a yearly assessment which 
fluctuated and · ave the false impres sion to the ryot that 
the plots under annual cultivation were b eing revised 
also . 
A third Per!'lanent Settlenent in 1833 occurred 
in the Northwest Province s or Hindos tan. This settle::1ent 
was nore practic al than ideal in nature, and the 
traditional native system was largely retained without 
c ontamination by western doctrine s and ideologies.  Howev er , 
the ob jective remained the sa.:re . The pr inciple source ot 
32The ryot i s  the peasant cult ivator .• 
33-i,l:ll..is , op. cit• , Vol . VII , P •  31 s .  
80 
friction o.rose ov er l?.I¥i owner ship , a s  disputed between 
the ryot c'1ld the talukdar , the l ri.tt er holding proprietal'J' 
right s that d ? t ed to ant iquity . De::iocratic 1 d eals w ere 
followed in reaching a s olut ion and so the ryot was 
favored over the talukdar . Thoueh democrat ic ideals ard 
ec onomic s  w ere on t he side o f  such action , political 
reason was not . The result i ng conse quenc e s w er e  that the 
talukdars were deprived of the ir land and power and thus 
los t  ::iuch of t heir initiat ive and leadersh :t p . The 
s ettle:::ent created cons ider able opposition toward the 
English and their policies and failed to gain tor the 
English any appreciat ion fror:i t hose who benefited. 
h'ith few exceptions the various land settler:ienta 
of the latter decade of t he eighteenth century and th e  
early decade s of the nineteenth century should be considered 
the i :agna Charta of t he privi leged clas se s . During the 
f'ollowin g decades this pre-eminent .'1,nd dominant clas s 
went undisturbed , se cure in t he  thought that their titles 
were valid and t heir tenure s ecure . 
The English had committed a serious error in the 
various land set tle::ient s  by grant ing rent in perpetuit7 
rather than tor a limited t err::i of several years . A short 
t erm nttleruent would hav e manii'ested t he same effects 
de s ired by the govermaent and further allowed the 
govemment to increase its tax as production, land values ,  
and cultivation increased . such was prohibited by the 
Permanent S ettle::ient s ,  and thus the government was deprive4 
Bl 
oi' fut ure sourc e s  of t r ::uit i cnal :. nd legi t i:::1 . .  te r evenue. 
Gradually t he i:.nr:;li nh began t o  a.waken to the 
errors of t he r ermanant S et t leI'lent s n:rd t o  realize t ha.t 
vast amount s of rev enue , past am futur e ,  were los t and 
t hut t he landlords were living like parasi t e s  on t he 
Engli sh government enjoying immens e  privi leges and 
immunitie s .  T he Bnglish further realized t he  grav e 
injustice and injury thnt had been done to t he t enant s •  
e n  masse.  
T he gngli s h  decided to r ecoup their losses and 
for the next twenty ye :: rs gradually resumed c ontrol and 
destroyed the power of tho gre .. t lanJlords . The English 
commenced whole s ale confi sctc.t ion of property un le s s  the 
i '1cumbent could e stablish 1ndisput ::..b1e proof of O"wner­
ship--mo st of '·1hich could not .  The fraudulent usurper 
and the r ightful possessor was deprived of hi s  property 
by indiscriminate confi sc.<J.ti cn. In th e Nor th-West 
Provinces  1 1the s et t lement officer swept up , uithout inquiry , 
ev ery patch of UlU'egist e1•ed land ; even thos e exempt ed by 
a subsec;uent order , which did not c o;:•e out unt il 1'1ve-
3lt 
s ixths of t he t enur e s  hud been r esumed . "  
In 1852 t he Inam Commi s sion was establi shed to 
inv e st igat e p:coperty t itles an:l " each d ay ,  produc ed its 
list of vict ims ; am the good fortune of those who 
escaped but added t o  t he p�ngs of the crowd who caDl.e 
fort h from t he shearing-hous e ,  shorn to the skin, unable 
---- ------- -·-
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to \·1ork , -:.: she.mad to beg , condemned t o  penury. "3; During 
the year s  1<'l 5'2-57 , t he Inam Conm1i ssion inve st ignt ed the 
t it le s of t hirt y-fiv e thous nr1d e s t at e ::; , thre e-fifths ot 
1:1hich •1ere conf1_ s c : ct cJd . '7' he c ominc t of th e c omr� i s s ion 
cau s ed ;' articnlu.r dis sa.t i sfn.ct ion in Oudh · ·hich suffered. 
e spnci o lly fro::1 t he ilw e s t i (; C! t i on . 3 6  
The c o '1 s e ,, 11enc e s  o f  t he :i_and-sett lomont s mid 
r e sumpt ion act i.ons of t he Eng li sh w er'3 far-reaching • 
It great ly swelled t he nuuber of ilisaffe c t ed ,  who consi st-
ed mai:-1ly o f  t he wenlthy and influantlal c }.us s e s , and 
who c r edit ed their desper:-,tion to t he l ·:ng l i s h  and now 
hoped for the o;:iportuni ty to r ecov er lost pou or and 
:'1 restige , at so· 1 e  future d �'t e ,  ct t he m:pens e o f  the 
J.i;ng li sh. Among t he � c  '.1 er e m.any noble s , mi litary chie fs ,  
anc i ent landhr:ld ers , �.,nd t he pri e s t ly cast es . The Engl11h 
had ::; ermano:-it 1y ::ili cn'.1ted t he affection of t he c-1ost 
pouerful wealthy , and inflnent i nl clas ses i n  India and 
t ho s e  groups held tre;·::ondons i:i.fln c nc e whic h could be 
It dr;e;; not t :, ' e  :iuch 1maginat i o ' '  to r eali ze the 
cons H lt :nc e ,c; cf  t �;c fiv 8 d ec ad e s  of :;nglish progr e s s  in 
India. In t h·' t : ' e:r iod of t ine t h e  :•;ngli sh tnstituted 
nu:1erous social and �o�al reforms as  t he elimination ot 
infant icide , s at i , dakoiti ,  and t hugee . Laws were inacted. 
-·--- ·- ----·- · ... ----�------------
35 Ibid . ,  P •  177. 
36rrobo:ct s ,  ..,o .... p,.. _c..,i.,t,.. , p • 
to legalize t he remarrio.ge of nat ive widows , educ (,t ion 
for the fet:ale was Litro1.luced , r eligious cru.sades were 
c o-riduct od , churches built , : nd ::iuperst it ion was super-
s ed ed by r eas o n . Many ·?C o nomi c  reforos \·Jere inst itut ed 
inc ludi:1g t he J.and-s ett lement s ,  c anal s , ro ad s , rai lroa-. s ,  
e.nd t elegraphs . 37�fow ideo.s  i !'l.  a ::itronony , scionce and 
surgery were introduc ed . 
It i s  obv ious , i n  v i ew of t hese refo rms , that a 
c la s h  b et i�een Eastern and ; Je s t er n  culture was inev it able , 
Furt hermore the rapid ity \11th which the s e  r e.ferns occurred 
s 0 cc.:ed t o  lend c r edence to the nat iv e fenr of r eform. 
Naarly every ne w and novel English innovation caus ed 
native alarm and fe2r . Mo s t  innov at ions were viewed as 
diabolical instrument s to de stroy t he c ast e of the natives 
and sub jugn.t o t hem to the will of t he Eng lish. 
It i s undoubtly true th;:;.t the s e innov ations would 
not hav e cc,nsed such great suspic ion w ere i t  not for the 
wide gap in cultures .38 The Eng lish 2nd Indians were ot 
different rac e s , customs , pre judic e � , ideas , hi story , 
religion ::md social po sit i on . Thus to t ho s e  who used 
religious and racial superstition. and pre judic e as instru­
ment s of opportuni tm , the opportunities •.iere unlimited .  
37Nat iv e suspicion o f  new innovat ions is 
reflect ed in the nameB attached to t hem. The railroad 
was r e:f.'erred t o  a s  t he "fire-carriage" and the telegraph 
as t he " li ght ni ng post stt • 
38F.ey lint op, cit&,, PP • 12-17 
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When these numerous reforms are added to the rear 
ot t erritorial aggrandizement and military reform, it 11 
obvious that the opportunity ror rebellion was ripe. 
;_,:nglish I ndia b:c. s'{ing i n  ::;lory , glo::.ti :ig  i n  unbounded 
succ e s s and s ecure L!. t he beli ef o:'...' prGpctual t ranquility . 
2 
The _;nglish, c.:1 th f 0'11 exc '.:l:ritions , s c ened unawaro 
of t he stormc louds t hat had gathe red during t bc p ast 
cent ury .  Dur ing this poI"i_ :x1 the Engli sh had unrelent in.:;ly 
added t o  their domains s o  t hJt in 1857 mos t  of t he Indian 
sub-cor:tinent wJ s under Eng lish sway . Ona aft er anot her 
of t he nat ive p:..·inc e s  ::::.ncl r ·, c e s  had succumod t o  English 
.,, ,b jU'' " t i  :) n   '-- · • £..-. '- . '. .l � .  The sl"J J.t mas s  of conqu e s t s had occurred 
by forcible c on'"'.nast DX' annexat ion. Furthe r .ore the r e  was 
se ldom a '.'iO'�iont o f  pause and t hus :..i t t le opportunity to 
r educ e t he irrit •".tion . Thous 2.nd s harbo;_• ,:id. in m0mory 
vivid b:w:iili.::i.tions onr.1 :'1any war e ch a �'ins at h:·, vin g  to 
e11d1�:..' 0  the r<, j a  of ,,_n a li en r ac e  and c r o e d . Thus a rnass 
----·----·- -------- - - ·-·-
1ubiquitou s  ru:1or s  held th �ct I�ngli sh rule in 
India 'i.JotL1.d t er�ninat e in one..;hucldr ed Y'�ars ; henc e ,  the 
yoar 18 57 he ld special si �nific nc1c e for the superstitous . 
2It i s  a di sturbin ,_; fact thct no one in authority 
in the Indian ;,:;overnment except S ir Henry Lawrence seemed 
t o  realize t he im:�inenca and 1mmen31ty of the impending 
di sast er . 
86 
ot constant disaffection ani entire hosts o.t' malcontent• 
existed. 
Among these,  most powert'Ul a.al dangerous , were 
the Moslems with whom religious antagonisms aI¥1 a desire 
to revive their anci ent preponderance were sources ot 
friction . Another major taction alienated by the English 
were the Marathas , a warlike ani unscrupulous Hindu rac e ,  
whose once pre-eminent empire had been split asunder by 
English expansion, however had it not b een tor the Englllh 
the Marathas would have been the masters in India. .A. 
third group , extensive in number , were those who d1rect17 
suffered from Engli sh annexation and the action ot English 
land policy . Thi s t1nanc1al17 and politically potent 
group harbored special grudges against the English. A 
tourth body or malcontents ,  especially dangerous in view 
ot their unbounded spirit and energy , were those whose 
out lets for ambition and opportunity for personal 
aggrandizement had been d estroyed by the English. A 
tinal group was the native army which suttered from novel 
nineteenth c entury western military innovations . T.he se 
fiv e categories provided a basis ot massive discontent . 
The abevant discontent manifest ed by these various groups 
was further aggravated by cultural, racial , religious 
and political differences . 
There were tour prominent features ot the 
Dalhousie regime which served to incite this chronic an4 
dormant unrest into active disaffection aid which 
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culminated in the Mutiny of 185'7. These were expansion, 
in particular the case of Oudh, the "Doctrine or Lapse" , 
the disproportinate rat io of English to native troops , 
and finally the dominant personality or Lord Dalhousie • 
The governor-general was "able , energetic , and bold, and 
withal devotedly bent on tulfilling his duty to the 
country , • • • an autocrat , exceptionally imperious , 
self-willed and self-sufticient . 113 These personality 
characteristics caused Dalhousie t o  r e j ect the traditional 
policy of relianc e  on native advice am suggestions and 
4 instead to r ely on a select few offic ers .  
Dalhousie returned t o  England in 1856 to r eceiY• 
a hero ' s  welcome and be eulogized for his brillant 
successes and spectacular career of expansion and material 
prosperity . Undoubt edly spectacular and glamorou1 , the 
Dalhousie regime errored in t bat it catered to the moral 
and material needs of India and ignored the delicate 
feelings , wishes , and thought s ot the native community .  
I t  was this suppressed feeling that openly manitestecl it-
' 
self in the Sepoy Revolt . 
The dye was caste and t he dest iny detel"Ill1ned when 
the new governor-general, Lord Canning (1856-62) assumed 
�cLeod Inne s ,  QP •  ci» • t  P • 16. 
4Th1s at least partially explains the government ' s  
unpreparednea s  axd surpris e  at the i� eption of the Sepoy 
Revolt . 
t:'.' 
:.iKaye , A History of the Senoy War in IQSlia, 
P •  470 .  
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control on February 29 ,  1856 .  There was nothing tb.at 
Canning could have done to r everse t he irrepres sible 
tide of conflict .  EVent s ot a oentur7 were against hill 
and fate j ettisoned him into the spotlight ot disaster. 
Canning further undermined his already precarious 
position when he promulugated the General Servic e  
Enlistment Act or July 25th, 1856. This act provided 
that all future enlistments in the eompaJU' ' s service 
would be required to cro1s the "blackwater" despit e caste 
and religious obligations . The inopportune issuance 
ot this order further agitated and inflamed t he alread.1 
explosive situation and had a demoralizing effect on 
the native troops . Many viewed it as a direct aid 
apparent manifestation of the government ' s  attack on 
religious cas·te and thus t he act coincided quit e well 
with the current sinister rwaor1 respecting the 
government ' s  designs to destroy the Hindu religion. 
This situation was furt her magnified by the prevalent 
but erroneous ballet that the act applied not only to 
future enlistments but to those presently in t he  service .  
The entire Sepoy army was affect ed by t he act , and it 
now began to listen to the whispers or sedition an4 
6 
rebellion. 
The 1mmediate ca.use of the Sepoy Rebellion 
6 
!RJ.4. ' p • 1+68 • 
involved the seemingly innocent replacements or the 
Brown Bess musket , with which the natives were armed, 
by the more modern Enfield rifle . Depots and cartridge 
factories tor the new rifle were e stabli shed at various 
places including Dumdum, Amballa, and Meerut.. The new 
rifle required cartridges of a new kind which were to 
be produced at the government factories near Calcutta. 
A lubricant was needed tor this cartridge , into which 
the soldier had to bite prior to use,  and it would appear 
that little caution was taken with regard to the animal 
fat used.7 
In January of 1857 ,  prior to the issuance ot a 
single cartridge, at the goverment magazine at Dumdum 
near Calcutta a low-caste factory worker taunted a Sepoy 
soldier by saying that the Sepoy army was about to lose 
caste en masse because of the issuance ot the se new 
cartridges which were supposedly greased with the tat ot 
swine e.nd cattle . These two animals were respectively 
sacred to the Hindu and Mohammedan am both religiona 
being affected by the same act now united in common defenae 
ot a sacred doctrine ! 
7 It i s  significant that the new cartridges were no 
novelty to India. As early as 1853 the new rifles and 
cartridges were tested in India, on order or the CO'lll't ot 
Directors to determine the etfeet ot climate upon th811l• 
At that t!me Adjutant-General Colonel Tucker ot the Bengal 
Army realized the potential danger involved in the use ot 
the Enfield rifle and warned against the issuance ot such 
weapons to the native troops. The warning went unheeded. 
I 
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The s tory could neither be categorically proved. 
or denied and so t he Sepoy soldier, taken aghast at th11 
supposedly intent ional perversion ot caste,  spread the 
alarm among his comrades . One otfioer at Dumdum wrote 
on J'anuary 22nd that "there appears to be a v ery un­
pleasant feeling existing among the native soldiers who 
are here tor instruction, regarding the grease used in 
preparing the cartridges • • • Some ot the depot men in 
conversing with me on the sub j ect last night said that 
the report spread throughout Ind.1a. •8Actually it is not 
clear whether it was an actual fear of the use or the 
cartridges themselv es or tear ot pub lic reaction to their 
use t hat determined the S epoy reaction. 9 
The conflagrat ion soon spread trom Dumdum to 
Barrackpore where the 34th Sepoy Regiment manifested 
considerable di scontent . Certain detachment s ot the 
mutinous 34th were unwis ely and naively permitted to 
march to Berhampore where they proceeded t o  contaminate 
the 19th Sepoy Regiment . OL. Feb?"" .. ;.ary 26th the 19th Regiment 
at Barham.pore retus9d to receive their precuss1on caps 
and were ordered to parade by Commandant Mitchell. Tba 
commandant sensed the seriousness and danger ot the 
situation, and without any English t roops for support , an4 
doubtful ot t he loyalty ot the native artillery, 
8areat Britain , fa.r:tiAm@Wia.rY PA"Qers, Vol. XXX 
(1857) , P • 37• 
9areat Britain, P§l41Amentarx Paper• •· Vol .  XLIV 
( 1857-58 ) , P • 178. 
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capitulated to the 19th Regiment . 
Meanwhile at Barrackpore the 3l+th Regiment had 
worked itself into a state ot feverish excitement . Evan 
when allowed to use their own grease the troops fanci ed 
that the cartridge paper cont ained objectionable grease . 
Hearing of the success of the 19th Regiment the 3l+th 
became ev en more arrogrant aoo were not pacified b7 
General Hearsey • s  admonition ot the possible consequences 
of their behavior. On March 29th open rebellion occurred 
when Sepoy Mungul Pandy , a self-proclaimed mutineer and 
savior of t he Hindu faith, began to incite others to 
rebellion and urged a g eneral uprising . Pand1 attacked. 
Adjutant-General Baugh and a small detachment ot Sepo7 
10 
troops r e.fused to come to Baugh ' s aid. Sev eral high 
ranking English officers were unsuccessful in ordering 
the native troops to seize Pandy. The troops tinall.1 
obeyed only on the orders of General Hearsey who 
11 
threatened their liv es and on t he  next day ordered the 
entire 19th Regiment disbanded. 
12 
10 Edward Gilliat , Ileroe§ of the iW1.J..rul Mut1I\l 
( Londona Seeley, Service and Co . ,  1914), p .  57� 
11areat Britain, P&rliam.estm Papets1 Vol .XXX 
( 1857 ) ,  P •  126. 
12Mungt� l Pandy was executed on April 8,  185' . 
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It was not until May 6th that the 34th Regiment 
was disbanded atter a period of indecision an1 proscrast1• 
nation by Lord Canning. Canning feared that hasty action 
would only confirm. rather than allay the evil temper 
ot the troops .  The twofold dilemma of how rapidly to 
act and the nature of the punishment to be inflicted. 
presented the English with a difficult problem. Indecision 
and laxity could produce as disastrous consequences aa 
decisive and harsh punishment . Canning ' s  conduct ma4• 
him the target of considerable critici sm to the effect 
that he did not react quickly enough and when he did it 
was with too much leniency . One young soldier wrote 
to his mother on May 2 ,  1857 ,  with regard to thia point a 
"Nothing by the harsheat and most s ev�e measures will 
put an et:t'eotual stop to this mutiny, and blood will 
flow in torrents before it is quell•d• "l.3,_.he same soldie� 
wrote again on June 16, 1857 ,  t hat the "government is a 
great deal too lenient and seems afraid to act with 
proper severity. n14Th1a latter comment aptlJ reflects 
the Sepoy thought on the subject because under the 
circumstances delay created the seriout misconception 
that the Engl:l. sh recognized their posit ion to be unjust ,  
and therefore their hesitancy to punish, rather t han  the 
13aeorge D .  Darker , :r.,,tters � Pei:sift and In41a 
is2z-59 (London1 G. Bell and sons , l9 , P • 3 • 
llt 
lW• t P •  1+5'. 
more accurat e opinion that English inact ion was mot i­
vat ed by humantarian principles.1' 
During this crit ical period in the spring ot 
1857 Northern India was visit ed by t he nobleman , Nana 
S ahib , whose tortured and greedy mind envisioned an 
opportunity tor revenge . Taking advantage of t he  
circumst ances , he passed through the c ities of Calpae, 
Delhi , Lucknow and ot hers al¥1 abett ed in the instigat ion 
of rebellion among the native princ es and troops .  Tb8 
English hardly noticed the pas sing of this nobleman who se 
presence in itself was enough to portend disaster . 
The threat to t he  English position spread during 
Apri l and M� and many other encampments manifested open 
detiance of the English, most notable among the se being 
Umballah, Lucknow anl Meerut . It was the latter ot these 
t hat created an irrevocable chain reaction that pre­
cipit at ed the Sepoy Revolt . 
Stat ioned at Meerut were the 11th ar¥l 20th I�ative 
Infantry Regiment s and the 3rd Nat iv e Cavalry . Violence 
was precipitated when Colonel Smyth ordered a parade of 
ninety men of t he 3rd Cavalr7 and all but five refused to 
accept t he new cartridges . An ensuing court-martial 
found some or  the men guilty, and on M� 9th the punish• 
ment was publically witnessed . Rebellion occurred on 
l5'The popular viewpoint that Canning was too 
lenient won tor b1lll. the dubious t itle ot ttClemency Canning . "  
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Sunday , May lath,  led by the enraged 3rd Cavalrl' , which 
teared disbandment , There now occurred massive plunder­
ing , pillaging , and murder as the sepoys took revenge 
16 
on eYery European unfortunate enough to 'be discovered •. 
Convict s were released am the native police joined in 
the melee . 
Commandant Hewitt was so stupified 'by these 
event s that he remained totally passiv e .  Unable to a ssUJle 
the initiative himself, he passed on his authority to 
Brigadier Wilson �;ho made a meager and abortiv e effort 
to thwart t he r evo lt . The mutineers now tearf'ul ot 
Engli sh r epri sals decided t o  march t o  Delhi , and that 
night lef't for the ancient Indian capito l  where , after a 
forty mile march , they arrived the next morning , 
Brigadi er Wilso n made absolutely no ettort , despite the 
admonitions of inferior officers , to del97 or thwart the 
march to Delhi though it would have been simple enough 
to have done so and so the final opportunity to prevent 
17 a successful rebellion was blindly and ignorantl.7 ignore4. 
Furtherr::ore th e failure ot the English to give pursuit 
or make any effort to warn t he English at Delhi resulted 
in di sastrous consequences and caus ed  the natives to 
suspect the Eng lish of lethargy . 
16 Holme s , op. gjj. , P •  99. 
17x.w,. , P• 101. 
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Ha4 the upr111ng been elaboratel,y and. thorou.sbl1' 
planned. the mutineers could eas1l.J haYe mad• them1alv01 
mastus 1n Northern India without much d1.t'fieulty. on 
tha contral'7, if' the '';nglisb had been preps.red tor thAt 
revolt it could Just as easi ly have been para�zfld 1D 1t1 
lnf'ancy .18 Neither happened to be the cat•J honce the 
insurgents were giV4Nl an oppcrtuntt1 to gain support 
tor their ca\1•• and the ,,r,g llsh an opPol'tunit1' to p:repa:re 
the counterattaek . The 4eploymont ot r�nglish troops at 
thAt outbffak of the rebellion wa:'l a oerioue di sadvantage 
and reserves were alm"st non-ex1stant . At Meerut there 
________ .....,.._ __ �..,.·----"'--- · 
18zt was pri.IM.r1lf1: tti.e quostion o f  the extent 
ot tho Ind.1& govo•n1::ient 1 s ·mowlodge of tho 1.mmen1nce 
ot the 11Utiny that interested. membGfs of parliament . 
Viseount Melville on December 10, 185'7 speaking to the 
11ou;?f'J of U:>rdi1 comment ed on the subJoct as .rollowea ttl' 
was extraord1na17 that t he local gov•.u·nment �hould have 
hud no into:::mat ion of an orfan1zed outin,y such at that 
uhich bed broken out in Ind a .  Ue believed it 'W&I 
peri'Htl1 well know that tho revolt vas to commence 
all O"f9l" the eountey on a eerta<o. n da11 but owing to som• 
m1sunderstand.1r:ig 1 t broke out a t.i."l.Y ur tw.") too early at 
Me.ut1 otherwise the disasters ue h&.4 now to deplore would r.ave bean tor gro�te1· . 11 i:alvi lle "foun.i fault with 
the local Government for not attaching due w•ight to the 
1ntormation which was c01:miunicc.ttd t o  t hem . .. . . Great 
Brita1n1 J I;Jan�·�u.11w1.ttJ>1'bet111 Vol. CXtVIII 
( 1857-50 ) ,  PP• 9- O. 
Mr1 D11ra.eli )"Jpeak1ns to the House ot Cornmona 
on July 2? , lts57 said• 1'1<.fhe noble . Lord ( ;,�arl Granville) 
there ingenuously intomtd the eount17 that the t"'r0vornmem 
were uttall' ta.ken b7 surprise both here am in India-­
that tventyfour hourt be:f'oro then nents oocurred ttwv 
did not nen suspect that anything was Wl"Or.tg . 11 • , Great 
Britain , 3 Q!f:h1r,g•a P1,1."l.1ammt�t..t.u., Vol. cx.tVII 
(185'7 ) ,  P •  • 
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were two Engli sh regiment s and some artillery ;  at 
Lucl\'.now , one regiment and some art iller/ J  at Dinapur , 
one regiment ; at Ccwnpore ,  a detachment of th e Lucknow 
r egiment . The n-'J.tive regiment s at the s e st at ions were 
as follows 1 geerut , three ;  Lucknow , four ; Dinapur , 
19 four ; and Cawnpore , four . 
At t he s t rat egically important stat ions of 
Benares ,  Allahabad and Delhi there were prac t i cally no 
Engli sh troops . Between t he Jamma ar:d Uerbadda Rivera 
English troops were almo st non-exi stent and thus in the 
area mo�t s eriously affect ed the English were least pre­
pared. The mutiny was primarily confined to t he stat ions 
generally described and Pax Britannica c eased to exist 
in these areas . The only s ecure Engli sh posit ion i n  
all India ,  exc ept for t he Madras and Bombay presidencies • 
was t he Punjab . The Pun j nb was made s ecure by t he 
exi st ence of t en Engli s h  regiment s , artillery and caval.r1 
and the deci siv e foresight ed act i on of such m an �s John 
Lawr enc e ,  John Nicholson, J.  D. Macpherson a nd  others who 
s ecured the d i strict for the Engl1sh .20 It was necessary 
to disarm some n2.tive regiments but becaus e ;:tan)" i•&giment s 
were composed or Punjabis and Sikhs ·who were naturall.7 
ho st i le t oward t he Mohammedans , an exc ept ionall.7 high 
l9s .  H. 
C larendoa Prei s , 
20 Kaye , 
P •  472 • 
Cunningham , fr� Qf!gping ( Oxford s 
1892 ) , PP • 9 ·9 • 
proportion remained 107al. 
The English reaction to the various mutinies was 
to r ecall troops from Persia, Burma , C eylon, the Mauritius 
and to int ercept t he expedit ionary force enrout e to 
China and seai for r einforcements from England . 21 
No new outbreaks occurred for t hree weeks after 
t he Meerut incident which adds credence to the argument 
that the mut iny was not especially well planned nor 
organized for t hat part icular moment . However toward the 
end or Hay t he r evolt began to ·spread rapidly and erupt 
into g eneral rebellion, and between t he lo.t t er p art ot 
May and t he middle of June nearly every regiment trom 
22 
Delhi to Benares  had mut ined. Mo s t  of the mutineers 
murdered their officers and march orr to either Delhi , 
2�wo event s prior to thos e alluded to had 
precipi·tous influenc e on the Sepoy Hevolt . Toward the 
end ot 1856 heretofore latent English difficulties with 
Persia erupt ed and finally culmin�1.ted in the Anglo• 
Persian War or 1856-57. A considerable force of English 
troops were d ispatched to r et ake Herat , whic h had fallen 
to P ersia, and thus at a critical moment an already 
small nwiiber or ;mglish troops was further dimini shed .  
This incident further alienated Indian Mohammedans toward 
t he English. 
At :>.bout t he same t ime England became involved 
in a war with China whereby the �ngl1sh were Qble to 
int ercept China-bound troops for use in India . 
22s1r De Lacy Evans in an address to the House 
of Commons o n  August lll 1857 estimated that 11110 t  less 
then ioo , ooo or the nat ve troops in India has been 
eit her desbandad or were in arms against us ; • • •  11 Great 
Britain , 3 .liansard ' s  Pa£lie.mente.ry Debat es , Vol . CXLVII 
( 1857) , p .  1397. The Earl of Ellenborough spaa\dng to the 
Hous e  of U:>rds on February 15,1858 landed credence to Sir 
De Lacy hvans estimate. Great Br i tain 3 �f:sard 's 
PAJ:;J.ia.mentarY }2e1:jates ,  Vol .  qXVII ( 18�7-�� P •  1362. 
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Lucknow , or Cawnpore .  
The ancient c:1.ty o f  Delhi became the focal point 
or action during the early part of the  Sepoy Rebellion . 
Delhi was import ant in that it was t he ancient capito l  or 
the Mohammedan Empire where tha aged Bahaudur Shah of the 
Timor dynasty s t i ll retained a symbolic an:'l t itular throne . 
The cit y was important not only by reason of a tradit ional 
nostalgia but because of its  strat egic and psycho logical 
value . Furthermore it contained a vast powder magazine 
that was pract ically inexhaustible an:'i for pract ical 
purposes unguarded by any Eng li sh troops .  
The Maerut mutineers eas ily gained t he support 
of the native regiment s in Delhi and on th e morning of 
May 11t h began unimaginable pi llaging and p lundering of 
the c ity. Enropaans were murdered en mas s e  and public 
buildings were bnrned . The Engli sh t e le graph operator 
was murdered �hile relati ng the c ircumstanc es  then 
occuring in De lhi to the gng lish s t ations at Lahore ani 
23 
Umbal1ah. The mut ineers then led a mas s  assault on the 
magazine which had been courageous ly defended for s everal 
hours by Li eut enant Willoughby ani eight English soldiers . 
Willoughby finally realized that aid from Meerut would not 
be forthcoming and ordered the magazine destroyed . The 
23 
Holmes , op. cit , ,  P •  105. 
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massive explo:1 ion kill<:d .10st of the nine i�n;",lish de­
f'('Y'.'.der :; n1d l , ·�<f')"' sepoy troops.  24 
':'ho co:1 ' 1lest oi.' '. •elhi 31;ruck a seriou s  blow to 
print!ry tas!-c of the ;;q; tis h w a �; t o  r acor.wuor tho city i'rom 
they 1 aid a<Jt c;e t o  t he city rind wa.i tod until l'oinforcer..1ont1 
wo ;_a ,;:aka an a.ttr.1.ck plausible . Ju.ring tho oe oonths 
-----·--- ___ .__,__,_n_ ..,,  _ _,, _ ___ ______ ______ _ 
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l)elhi . 
lOl 
About half' o f  the s e  were English, the remnant being 
S ikh and Gu:rkhas rai s ed in the Punjab .  The Delhi de­
fenders nc mbered in the vicinit y of 3 0 , 000 to 50 , 000 
men. 
During the seige a number of bloody skirmishes 
o ccurred a s  the nnt iv e  defenders at t acked : ;nglish 
positions but e ach was suc c e s s fully repulsed .  The English 
'.�ere more serious ly p la:;ued by the cholera a."\i sunstroke 
t han by eneLly troop s . George Anson, the Eng li sh Commander .. 
in-Chiei' who ordered t he cons ent:.:at ion on :Velhi , soon 
died o f  the pl.: gue and was replac ed by Heru·y Barna.rd . 
Barnard met a like fat e on July 5th ani was suc c eeded 
by Thomas Reed who in tur·n g av e  way t o  Archdale Wilson 
on the 17th o f  June . In e arly Sept er:iber no les s than 
2 , 800 Engli sh t ro op s were hospitili zed for v arious causes 
other than by t ho s e  of a milit ary natur e "  
On S ept ember 11th the effort t o  storm Delhi began, 
and during the 12th and 13t h  t he  inglish b atteries pow¥1ed 
away at t he city . On t he 14t h  Duncan Home ar¥i Philip 
Salkheld wer e successful i n  blowing up t he Kashmir gate 
which allowed Colonel Caopball to ent er t he ci tf am 
John Nicholson to form t roops within t he wall of the city . 
Though Nicholson was mort ally wounded in t he attack , the 
English had gained a footho ld wi t111n the city . 27 During 
27D . w. Bart let t , The Heroes of the Indian 
Rebellion (Columbus , Ohioa Follett , Foster and Co , 1  
1859 ) ,  P •  310. 
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t he next week, due to the stubborn resistanc e  of t he  
Sepoys , t he English advanced inch by inch until by the 
21st General Wilson occupied the imperial palace .  The 
King or Delhi was taken prisoner and t he  three princes 
28 
captured and shot by William 11 . Hodson the next day. 
Im:Jediately following the fall of Delhi , Bnglish and 
native troops were det ac hed and s ent to aid Cawnpore , 
and t he mut ineer army of De lhi fled to join t he army 
of Oudh. 
�he s econd major c ent er of military operations 
was at Ca-wnpore . \vhen news arrived at Cawnpore of t he  
mut iri.ies at Heerut and Delhi , Commandant Hugh Wheeler 
iuraediately r ealized. the s erious ness of the circumstances 
but with only fifty ::;:iglish arti llerymen he dared not 
29 
attempt to disari:i t he four S epoy regiment s .  He decided 
to prepare for the defense and s ecurity or t he 330 women 
and children , and on the 21st o r  Hay these non-combatants 
took refuge in an improvi s ed entrenchmen t . However 
Wheeler ' s  ac t ions betray ed his own t hought s and aroused 
t he suspicions o f  the S epoys . During the cour s e  of the se 
event s the Hana Sahib, concealing his hat e  am grudge 
because of �alhousie ' s  denial of a life time pension 
paid to his adoptive fathe r ,  Baji . ,ao , offered his Maratha 
28 Leasor , 2...:.._.cit1 ,  PP • 342-49 . 
290 . o .  Trev elyan , Cawgpo:&:i ( London.: 1 Iac::1j_ ll::m 
and Co . ,  1865) , P• � .  
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troops t o  guard the treasury .3°on June 8th the Nana 
Sahib treacherously order ed the powder magazine s eized 
and the four ll.:-1.t iv e  regiments mut ined . Thus began the 
s eige of Cawnpore which last ed until June 27th. 
By thi s time ; fueelor had at his command 240 
.Sne li sh t roops with which he had t o  prot ect nearly 870 
non-comb ::.tant s and resist t he enroachments of 4 , ooo 
native troo p s . During the seige the Cawnpore garri son 
manifested ext raordinary r esolLtion and courage and 
poured so fierce a musketry ani art i llery fire at the 
besi eg ers that th67 were c onst antly forced to retreat . 
Howev er insurmount able odds eventually began to gain swq 
as t he beseiged could not replace tho se who f ell. 3
1 
Though t he garrison could have held out c onsid erably 
longer , t he mi s ery , suffering , c asualt ies , and t he 
welfare of the women and children c aused Wheeler to 
decide t o  surrender the fortifi c at ions . The Nana Sahib 
gav e  his sworn guarant ee for t he safety of th e defenders 
and promi sed t hat boat s would b e  prov ided for their 
departure , under safe conduc t ,  v ia the Ganges River to 
Allahabad . On t he 27t h  of June as the surrendered and 
demoralized garri son was about t o  depart , a withering 
----------- -- ---·---------
31Bart lot t , .... o'"'p .... _c ... 1..,.;t,.. , PP • 208-10. 
an4 mur<lerous tire vas opene4 upon th• by the Nana. • 1  
native troops. One young sol41er 9 tn a letta to hla 
mother dated August 2 ,  1357, describes the massacre u 
follo·,1s1 
Mot halt the detai ls  of the horrible mas sacres 
at Cawnpore ai-G known , and 1aey nner wi ll 'be 
ltnown . I wns s:'.wa.lr.1ng to 11 nntiYo this t1orn1ng 
who "111S pre!3en; at o e  dreadful scene i when the 
boat !:! vere tired into f'rom the ba.'1ks , one of 
t hem was cut udrtrt , and float ed down the rive 
unharmed; but a pan:r or '.'lepoy:"J were '"nt a.ttc 
thom the noxt mo1•11ini:; and bi·ousf . t th1ri back. 
11"!':.oy wore all brought on shore , the gont 1'1l!l81'1 
a.11 tie<l with l'Opes.t and tl:eir vives and chi ldren 
e11ncing to th9r.l . i. wo eomrianios of' �epoys w.H 
dr$."Nn up t c  fire upcn the men , and th11 ladies 
were told thr/ wore t o  b" saved� but some ot 
the cl\mg to their husba.'lds aoo begged to be 
shot -.11th them . The �epoys had to d.ra,e ths 
away by force, and the order was given to !ire. 
0'�0 or th e po.rty was a clergy-ian , who begr;G4 
that a short t ime might be allowed the.::: £� 
prayer, which wa ".l grant«l. Thoy then all shook 
hauas t and took the ir places in tront ot the 
soldiers . Tbe tiring 0011t-H!'lnood and they tell 
wounded and ki lled. on the ground. The :3epc11 
thGn took Ut their SWOX'dsl am t�nishad the 
work by 1".acs:ing them t o  p eces. :i"' 
The ;;.•ema.ining wonen and chi ldren, numbering 
abo t 125 t .,;ei�e tn.1'1'.e . .  back to Cawpori.?. '!hree weeka 
later as Gonc1•al ; ionry lluvalocl:t ' a torce$ convo:r;ed on 
Cawitpoi·e aa<l defeated the Nana Snh1b ' ::i t"orcea, t he wom.n 
and child:i:en were butchered and .-aut1 latad and '.:heir 
bodies thi'ow.n :i nto a well . Tho young soldier all:u4 ... 
to was among the relief �xped.ition to Cawnpore and. 1n 
.. ..  -· ...... ··--�-·-·- .. ---.... ..-_ ..... ______ .. __ _ .,,.._ _ .. _____ ._._."' ___ " __ .,,__,,__.._ 
io; 
a letter to his mother d<i.t ed. July 19 , 185'1 he 'aot e 
a description of t he mas sacre and English reaction a1 
follows a 
But I mu s t t el l  you the sad news whi �h had 
made evon our v ictories painfu l . The stories 
which we h�d he ::ird of all t he Europeans having 
been c ruelly :na.s sacred had proved true, but 
t he women and chi ldr en , amongs t  whom were many 
ladi es of t he stat i o n  and of our 32nd Regiment , 
were '.cept aliv e ,  though in a wr etched state of 
destituion , all huddled toget her in a small 
dark room to t he number , I beli eve , or nearly 
ioo , fed upon ?lour and wat er ,  and sub j ect ed 
to 1nsult . We had heard of their being alive, 
and ev eryone had been mos t cheerfully enduring 
all fati gue s in pursuing the enemy and fighting 
our way up ·.�i th all speed in hopes of being able 
to rescue arid save thJ s e unfortunat e he lpless 
one s ,  but what was our rage and i ndignat ion to 
find on our arrival t hat the day b efore the 
action they had all b e en mo st horribly murdered , 
and t heir bodie s  stripped of ev erythi ng , all 
throvm down a well . Can you b e li ev e  thot the se 
devils ( I can call t hem nothing else ) threw 
down the innocent babes alive i nto a well to 
die on the ma s sacred bodie s  of their mothers . 
The sc ene of thi s tragedy i s th e most paintul 
s i g ht thnt ev er was witne s sed and if aver 
raven ef'ul fee ling against one ' s  enemies were 
allowable I shot1 1d th ink t hey were so now. 
L'v ery British soldier in this place i s  fired 
with indignat ion t.nd longin g to avenge t he 
s lai n.33 
The Nana Sabhi h<.:>.d reeked a horrible vengeanc e upon the 
British. 
The fall o f Cawnpore made t he seige of Lucknow 
a c ertainty. S ir Henry Lawrence ,  sure that a struggle 
was imminent , had carefully prepared t he def'ens e  of' the 
-------- ____________ , _ _ _ 
33 �. , PP• 57 ... 58 .  
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Lucknow residency for t he seige which began June 30th.
34 
The military situation at Lucknow was as precarious as 
that of Cawnpore because of t he endless flow of refugees 
including many women and children. In June , Lawrence 
could depend on about 700 loyal S epoys and 1 , 000 Eng li sh 
troops for defense or the residency but by Sept ember 
this had dwindled to 1 , 200 effective s .  The Lucknow 
garrison suffered miserably during the s ei ge as wound s 
3 5  
and u i se :- s e di spos ed of n::: ny non-combatr·nt s .  Com-
munic tions wit h the out side world were severed and rumor s 
of impending disast er were rife . The garrison was 
36 
being cont inually depleted of manpower and provisions . 
Aft er Hav elock defeat ed the Nana Sahib ' s  forces 
at Cawnpore ,  he prepc-red to march on to Lucknow . How­
ever he was twic e forc ed to r etreat to Cawnpore ani the 
latter retreat from Oudh seemed t o  t he local chieftains 
a symbol of the abandonment of t he Lucknow garrison 
and sany of these chieftains now contribut ed troop s to 
besoige the city . In Sept ember reinforcement s arrived 
at Cawnpore and a third effort , under the c ombined forces 
... lt 
j Mc Leod Innes 1 I,µckno� �a owi1 �n ;ee Mutiny ( Londona A .  D .  Innes and Co . ,  1 9 , PP • . 9- • 
3 �
tawrence w�s killed on July 2nd and wo s thus 
the first c asualty o f  the s eige . 
36
t. E .  Rees , �ege ot Luckngw ( J.ond.ona 
Longman ,_ Brown , Grean , ngma.ns , am Robe1•t s , 1858 ) , 
PP • 131-'+ 3• 
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of Generals Outram and Havelock , was made to relieve 
Lucknow . On the 2 5th of Sept 001ber t he 2 , 000 man army 
f'ought i t s  way :Lnto the Lucltnow r e sidency which was now 
37 t enporarily relieved . The additional manpower was 
welcome but it also c aus ed a manifold increas e i n  the 
problew o f  p roviding proper provis ions , 
The s econd relief of Lucl{now occurred in 
November when 31r Colin Campbell with 4,ooo Delhi 
reinforcement s cros sed the Ganges River . On the 12th 
C ampbell ' s  forc e s  r eached t he r e sidency and aft er over­
coming the det ermined resistance of 30, 000 r ebel troops ,  
ent ered the re sidency on t he 17th. On March 21st the 
city of Lucknow fell to t he �nglis h  and gradually the 
38 
entire province of Oudh was recovered. 
In c entral India du.ring March and April of 1858 
S ir Hugh Ros e conquered Jhansi and Gwalior from t he 
39 
insurgent leaders Tant ia Topi and Jhansi Tani . The 
conquest of the se two cities , for all practical purpos es, 
marked an end of the Sepoy Rebellion. During the next 
year the Eng lish were primari ly engaged in subduing a 
guerrila type warfare , t ho last flanes of whic h ,  were 
--------- --- --------···--- --,_......,.... 
P •  225. 
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HcLood Inne s , Luck.Qow nIJl Oude in ttie +1uti:gx, 
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Ibid , ,  P • 21 8 . 
39 G ,  B. Ma lleson , Histozy of' ;the i:wu.,a; Mut1QX, 
1857-59 (3  vols . , :.Ondon: w. H .  Allen and co . 1878) ,  
Vol. III , P •  16$. 
e:r; t inqu1shed by April of 12 59 ·..:hen the Tantia Tcp1 \HS 
40 
betrayed anu captured. 
--- .. ·- -- - �-- --- - --- -..... .. �,., �----.... - ·-- _,, _ _ _  .. '• ·- _ ,  ... __ _ __  
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The Nana ':lahib fled t o  Nepal and '.1as never 
heard or ag� 1 n .  
COl'lClliSIOI 
A century ot rapid political lllilttarr, social 
an4 economic innovations were the major contribut i r:c  
factors to the Sepoy Hebellion. These change s  created 
massive e.nd widespron4 discontent ...ti ic h culminated in 
revolutio11 . 
Actually the revolt effected only the Bengal 
presidency which may be explained by the contrasting 
nature and c ompositi':n ot the Sepo7 armie s  in the three 
presidencies and by the fact th1t mos t  ot t he r eforms 
alluded to manifested greater consequJnces in that 
pre1idanc1. 
The primary participants in the revolt were 
the Hindu Sepoys ot Bengali t he Moslema ot the Ganges 
provincess the talukdars in OudhJ the titular lead ·rs ot 
the detunct Maratha Empire; and the Moslema who desired 
a restoration o f  t he anci ent Mogul Empire. The reasons 
tor the Hindu upri sing are c lear , but as D1sraeil 
concluded the Sepoy army wa s "not so much . the avengers 
ot profes sional gr i evances as th<J exponent s or general 
discontent . "l+l Though it was the Hindu Sepoys that a���-� 
-····-----------------·------
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lt \.las the Hoslams that soized cont ro l of t ha revolt 
for polit 1a al purposes . In reality the Moslems were 
att empting to '·1e.ka the Hindu Sepoy army a puppet ror t heir 
own poli t i cal riot ives . 
It appl'l&?'s 2,bn0.da.nt ly c le rir thnt tt:ere w�1s no 
Hindu conspiracy or effort t o  fo1Jent rebfill lion , but it 
i s  equa lly clat'.r th t ther 1> was a i losler: plot t o  1 nc 1  t e  
rebellion a s  a rr.qans to Mogul restor�· t 1on . Obv101 �s ly 
the plot was not well c alculated or organized and it 
was only accidental that the c artridge incident provided 
the d i s affected Hosle�s wi th t he des ired opyortunity. 
It \JOu 1d be a �'.1a j or mi scalcu l!'!tion to t erm the 
Sepoy Hevolt a nat ionalistic move·'l•mt in any con 1otation 
lt-2 of the term. I t  was S L'iply a r evolt t hat grew out ot a 
protr�c t ed r eriod of transgres sion and gri evances • The 
revo lt was not characterized by a unified spirit or 
nationali s t i c  goal and except for the Nana 3ah1b ,  Tantia 
Tor,1 , Jhans i Tani and a few les ser chiefs the revolt was 
totally void or leadershi p .  
The peculiar and inevitable o b s erva t i on conc erning 
the revolt i s  the naive amat eur unavarene s s  of the India 
government ot the imminence of t he cr1si a .  Only Henry 
Lawrance see:ned to s en!'te the threat ani 1 t s  potent 1al 
proport ions . 
----- --·- ---- -------
l+2Disraei l ma i nt ained in an addr a s :J  to the House 
of Commons in ,July 27 , 18;7 thnt it was a nat i onali stic 
revolt • ..  f
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The im:::adiate cons equ.:nce s  of t he r evolt 11era 
profound . Mo st important among the s e  \ia s  th e change in 
aut hority as India passed from tho century old grasp of 
the i::ast India Company to t he '.:,ng li sh Crown . On Nove:nbar 
1, 1858 India c a:.:e under the d iroct c ont ro l  of t h a  ;:ng liah 
Crown and Lord Canning became t he first V ic eroy of India. 
Anot hn· re sult 1 n ::; t he r eorganizat ion of t he 
mili t ary bot h n�{ t i v e  and :;ng li sh .  'T'he Gng l i sh 1nc r ·1 '.· s ed 
the rat io o f  Eng lish to n a t iv e  t1•oops ard reor g :mi zed 
the nat iv e  army so a s  to ''.1Ve i t  a graa t ar pro1·,or ti or. of 
Eng lish of'f'icer :; with gre::,.t er power s .  Cannin,z: al so 
revorsoo JJnlhOUsies 1 ";)oc t r i ne Of T,ap s a "  policy and 
guar nnt 0 Jd th e r i ght Of adopt io>.1 art! StlCCl393iOn to the 
nat i 'J e t hrone s .  
Thus the !3V ent s bet · 1een i13y of 18 )7 :'?.nd April 
1 S 5.S ::.anife :: t ed :'rofound cons a (l '.Hmc e s  for India and 
the [�nglish F.nd ushe�ed in r, new era . 
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